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In the western world, the discourse surrounding Islam is often oversimplified 
and prejudiced, falsely portraying Muslim women as the symbol of oppression and 
leading to other damaging consequences. Because of this, it is important to deepen the 
conversation about feminism and Islam, decentering hegemonic western feminism that 
excludes those outside of the categories of white, secular, liberal feminists. This thesis 
seeks to understand why a dominance of western feminism exists, how theories of 
transnational feminism support the realization of local feminisms, how Islamic 
feminism functions in the Moroccan context, and what obstacles Islamic feminism faces 
towards reaching peace and equality between genders in Morocco.  
In order to do so, this research examines the background of the Islamic feminist 
movement through the Moudawana (The Moroccan Family Code), the UN Convention 
on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Arab 
Spring, and interpretations of contentious verses of the Quran through an Islamic 
feminist lens. Using both literature and the perspectives of Islamic feminist scholars 
interviewed in Morocco, this study provides a basis of understanding about women’s 
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movements in Morocco and the obstacles Morocco faces. This thesis concludes that, 
through Morocco’s recent political reforms, social movements, and the work of 
nonprofits (which seek to reinterpret the Quran and involve the collective family unit in 
solutions toward equality to encourage independent religious interpretations), the 
Islamic feminist movement is valuable in improving gender justice in Morocco through 
a culturally compatible framework.  
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Introduction  
As I prepared to study abroad in Morocco, friends and strangers alike offered 
their unsolicited advice: “dye your hair brown,” they said, “you don’t want to stand 
out.” “Will you wear a veil over your face so you don’t draw attention to yourself?” 
they asked me. I was surprised. I had chosen to study abroad in Morocco because I 
wanted to live somewhere that would help me gain perspectives outside of the ones I 
carried as a white, middle-class, US American from a small town in Oregon. I had 
chosen Morocco so that I could begin to learn Arabic, practice my French, and take 
courses on multiculturalism and human rights through seminars focused on Morocco’s 
participation in the Arab Spring uprising – a movement that I knew almost nothing 
about but was eager to understand and learn how it shaped current global politics. But 
was I being naïve? “Aren’t you worried about how you’ll be treated as a woman there?” 
People asked me over and over again. “Isn’t it dangerous?”  “Be careful!”     
I boarded the plane to Rabat with my blonde hair untouched by any dark-hued 
dyes and a backpack filled to the brim with clothes, medicines, and journals. The echoes 
of my neighbors’ warnings lingered in the back of my mind, but I was confident that I 
had made the right decision. Within a few days of landing in Rabat I would be living 
with my host family, adjusting to a life that was simultaneously so very different and so 
very similar to the life I led back home. Despite being awoken by the call to prayer as 
the sun rose each morning, and the fact that I required an introductory demonstration on 
how to use my host family’s Turkish toilet, I settled into a routine.  
After school I would go to a café to use the internet, and in the evenings I would 
come home to watch “The Voice” with my family. My 13-year-old host brother would 
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help me with my Arabic alphabet and I would help him with his English grammar 
worksheets. I looked forward to Friday couscous with my host family and weekly visits 
to the hammam (public baths). In the mornings before school, I would share bread and 
tea with my host parents as we watched the news in Darija (Moroccan Arabic). My host 
dad would ask me about my dreams from the night before as a way to start 
conversation. One morning, breaking news flashed on the TV about the most recent 
terrorist attack committed by ISIS (Daesh), and my host dad expressed the pain he felt 
in watching a group commit acts of terror in the name of Islam. Ce n’est pas l’Islam. Ils 
ne sont pas musulmanes, he would say to me. This is not Islam. They are not Muslim. 
My host family taught me what being Moroccan and being Muslim meant to them.   
Within a few weeks, I was interning as a research trainee at the Center for Study 
and Research on Women in Islam, where I was exposed to meaningful discussions that 
challenged my stereotyped perceptions of Islam and informed a more nuanced view on 
what it means to be a Muslim woman in Morocco. I thought back to the people in my 
hometown who told me that I would not be comfortable in Morocco because it is a 
Muslim country and women there are not treated fairly. This made me even more eager 
to investigate the women in Morocco who defy this notion, and who view Islam as a 
source of strength and empowerment rather than oppression. Through this internship, I 
gained access to the resources to begin my thesis on Islamic feminism in Morocco. 
Through my coursework I gained a deeper understanding of the social movements and 
political policy that have shaped Morocco’s sociopolitical environment today.  
My experiences in Morocco helped to knock down my own prejudices and 
confront the implicit biases that I carry unwittingly but that pervade my worldview. 
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Conducting this research for my thesis was also an exercise in expanding my 
understanding and complicating my perspective on the nuanced subject of feminisms 
that exist in cultural contexts outside of the US. In writing this thesis, it is impossible 
for me to remove myself from my identity as a US-based feminist who originates 
culturally and geographically from what is considered “the West.”  Throughout my 
research, I have endeavored to de-center my own perspective as a western feminist by 
listening to and learning from the lived experiences and informed theories that differ 
from those that I have grown up knowing.  
Through my interviews with religious scholars and Islamic feminists, I had the 
opportunity to inquire and learn with a particular intention to avoid imposing my own 
assumptions and bias. Islamic feminist scholar Saba Mahmood (2012) maintains that in 
exploring these subjects, we cannot “assume that the political positions we uphold will 
necessarily be vindicated, or provide the ground for our theoretical analysis, but instead 
hold open the possibility that we may come to ask of politics a whole series of questions 
that seemed settled when we first embarked upon the inquiry” (p. 39). Similarly, 
according to Mahmood (2012), understanding feminist dynamics in cultural context 
requires “self-scrutiny and skepticism regarding the certainty of my own political 
commitments, when trying to understand the lives of others who don’t necessarily share 
these commitments” (p. xi). I have found that, with the privilege I hold based on my 
geopolitical positionality, I must choose to be open to the possibility of expanding and 
changing my perceptions of the cultures outside of my own.  I propose that a certain 
extent of self-scrutiny is beneficial in understanding all diverse forms of feminisms, and 
this is a useful lens through which to read this thesis.   
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This is a critical time for both discussions surrounding feminism and discussions 
surrounding Islam. In the western world, the discourse surrounding Islam is often 
oversimplified, leaving Muslim women portrayed as the symbol of oppression and 
Muslim men portrayed as extremists. Because of this, it is important to deepen the 
conversation about feminism and Islam, moving away from the over-simplification that 
our western society forces on the Muslim world by centering the study on people who 
break this stereotype - highly educated Muslim women, Muslim men who identify as 
feminists, and feminist leaders in Morocco – who are striving to find solutions for the 
social issues their country faces.  
Through local analyses of Islamic feminist theory, this thesis strives to provide 
insight into the struggles for equality and justice that exist within Islam for Moroccan 
women, and will demonstrate how Morocco’s recent social movements and political 
reform have made way for an Islamic feminist movement that provides interpretations 
of the Quran through a feminist lens. 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
Much of my research on Islamic feminism, its nuances, complexities, and 
controversies, was obtained through interviews that I conducted while I was living in 
Rabat, Morocco in the spring of 2016. As the capital of Morocco, Rabat was an apt 
location to perform a study on legislative reform and social movements affecting 
women’s rights in the country. To conduct this research I relied on interviews with 
scholars and experts on the subjects of what Islamic feminism means to them, how it 
impacts Moroccan society, and critiques on Islamic feminism. The interviews were all 
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conducted with professionals or experts in the areas of Islamic feminism, Islam, or 
nonprofits that work towards women’s rights in Morocco, in order to gain an academic 
understanding of the subject.  
Choosing to interview mostly scholars puts the spotlight on voices that are 
underrepresented in the western world, and also breaks the stereotype that the western 
world imposes on the Muslim world. By featuring the perspectives, work, and research 
of Moroccan men and women who identify with the Islamic feminist movement, I seek 
to avoid imposing western perspectives on a story that is not mine to tell. These are men 
and women whose work and ideology go against the stereotyped image of Muslims that 
is generated in the US. My hope is that highlighting the voices of these scholars will 
inform the western public about the diversity of the Muslim world and Muslim people, 
and create a narrative based from the people themselves.  
In Morocco, I interviewed six people for this thesis. Two of my interviewees are 
from the Center for Study and Research on Women in Islam (CSRWI): Asma Lamrabet, 
a highly regarded Islamic feminist scholar and director of the CSRWI, and Ilyass 
Bouzghaia, a lead researcher at the CSRWI. I interviewed a government official who 
preferred his name remain confidential about the role of the Mourchidats (female 
religious guides) in representing women in positions of authority in mosques throughout 
Morocco. For his privacy, I have obscured his identity and will refer to him under the 
pseudonym, Adil Marjouane. In order to learn more about the nonprofit organization 
Musawah, a global movement for equality and justice in Muslim family law, I 
interviewed Coordinator of the Secretariat for Musawah, Houda Zekri. I interviewed 
Stephanie Bordat, a US American lawyer who heads the nonprofit organization 
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Mobilising Rights Association (MRA), to gain her perspective on women’s rights in 
Morocco from a legal perspective. Lastly, I interviewed Manal Dao-Sabah, a PhD 
candidate with an in-depth knowledge of Islamic feminism in Morocco, about Islamism 
and the misconceptions and obstacles she observes in the movement.  
The use of human subjects in my research was approved by the UO Institutional 
Review Board with exempt status, meaning that my interviews posed no risk to the 
subjects who are all scholars or experts in their field. Since I interviewed my subjects 
about their research or area of professional expertise, I was not concerned about 
receiving skewed information. I worked hard to construct neutrally worded questions 
that minimized bias in order to further avoid skewing the responses. All interviews were 
conducted in person, except for one, which was conducted over the phone. All 
interviews were conducted in English. Each interviewee signed written Informed 
Consent Forms to consent to participating in the study. Each interviewee was given the 
option to have their identity remain confidential, and all but one agreed to disclose their 
full name and professional title in the study.  
The rest of my research draws from primary and secondary academic sources 
that provided me with complex discussions about understanding research in different 
cultures and communities than my own, and nuanced presentations of Islamic feminism 
in Morocco and other parts of the Muslim world. Other texts informed my discussions 
on Morocco’s law, social movements, political reform, and culture.  
It should be noted that Islamic feminism only represents one of the many 
feminisms that exist in the Moroccan context. Also, this thesis focuses specifically on 
the intersection between Islam and feminism in relation to Morocco’s recent legal 
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reforms and social movements. Since this dialogue is very much rooted in the role of 
women in public and private spheres, the topics are often limited to heteronormative 
discussions of men and women within Islam and society. That is not to say that broader 
discussions of gender outside of a male/female binary do not exist, but rather that these 
concerns are not central to the current theological discussions within the Islamic 
feminist movement in Morocco as identified by the scholars and activists with whom I 
spoke.   
With Chapter 1, I begin this thesis by examining how the dominance of western 
feminism is rooted in orientalism, and how theories of transnational feminism can 
subvert the dominance of the west by advocating for local feminisms. This discussion 
produces a framework that strives to center Morocco’s Islamic feminism in an 
exploration of the intersection of Islam and feminism in the Moroccan social and 
political context.  
In Chapter 2, I discuss the background of the Islamic feminist movement 
through legislative reform such as the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of 
all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the reformed Moudawana (The 
Moroccan Family Code), the reformed constitution of 2011, and government mandated 
reform that created a role for women as religious leaders called Mourchidats.  
In Chapter 3, I delve into the current efforts towards grassroots women’s 
movements and Islamic feminist research that are taking place in Morocco. Specifically, 
I focus on Musawah, a nonprofit that works for equality in the Muslim family, and the 
Center for Study and Research on Women in Islam (CSRWI), a theological research 
center that focuses on reinterpreting the Quran from a feminist perspective.   
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In Chapter 4, drawing from the context of recent reform and movements, I 
closely explore what Islamic feminism means in Morocco. Through the work of the 
CSRWI, I discuss the diverse interpretations and definitions of Islamic feminism. An 
integral part of the Islamic feminist movement is in the fact that there are religious 
scholars providing their feminist interpretations of Quranic verses to justify gender 
equality through Islam, and Chapter 5 of this thesis I present examples of 
reinterpretations of such verses. Activists and scholars argue that these readings can be 
used to promote progressive change through Islam.  
My thesis will conclude that Islamic feminism is valuable in improving gender 
justice in Morocco through a culturally compatible framework. However, I will also 
point out the areas in which Islamic feminism in Morocco can expand its reach through 
further progressive reform and more inclusive language. Overall, my thesis will open up 
a deeper analytical and conscientious discussion of women in Islam.  
My research in Morocco began as an exploration of Islamic feminism in 
response to western critiques of it being inherently contradictory or impossible; 
judgments based on uninformed prejudices. Through my research, I seek to deepen the 
conversation about feminism and Islam in Morocco, decentering hegemonic western 
feminism. In reviewing feminist literature and intersectional feminist theory, and 
through interviews I conducted with Moroccan scholars and Islamic feminists during 
my semester in Morocco, the methodology provides a basis for understanding women’s 
movements in Morocco, the role of Islamic feminism in social, political, and religious 
spheres, and the obstacles faced thereof.  
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework and the Politics of Feminism 
Globally 
Many assumptions exist about Islam that affect the way westerners perceive 
Muslim women. Prejudice and stereotypes are learned ideas, which can lead to socially 
constructed perceptions about what is true about the “other.” So, what can explain the 
false assumptions that westerners hold against other cultures or groups of people? What 
started the cultural dominance of the west? While literature illustrates that there are 
many ways in which Muslim women are stereotyped, it is also clear that these 
stereotypes stem from colonialism and western dominance.   
This chapter seeks to answer these questions by examining the roots of western 
superiority and discussing transnationalism. In doing so, this chapter will decenter 
hegemonic liberal feminism and open a discourse about Islamic feminism that does not 
rely solely on what are considered western values. First, I will use Edward Said’s theory 
of orientalism and cultural dominance to discuss the prevalence of stereotypes and 
prejudice that pervade modern perceptions of Muslim women in the US and other 
western cultures. Drawing from authors Chandra Talpade Mohanty and Lila Abu-
Lughod, among others, I will deconstruct the idea of using women as a category of 
analysis, and address how such stereotypes and generalizations relate to the assumptions 
made about Muslim women historically and contemporarily – including the idea that 
Muslim women need saving (Abu-Lughod, 2002). I conclude this chapter with an 
analysis of the varied definitions of the concepts of agency, freedom, and 
empowerment, which have their own significance in Muslim culture and are valuable to 
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locate in specific cultural contexts in order to form a study on Islamic feminism in 
Morocco.  
 
Stereotypes and Cultural Superiority 
In his book Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (1978), Edward 
Said addresses the broad systems of stereotyping and cultural dominance, and how they 
originated in our global society. Said describes orientalist scholars as those who sought 
to study the Middle, Near, and Far East and then decidedly lumped each culture 
together into one homogenous group. This practice of orientalism began during 
European colonization, during which time Europeans exoticized the “lesser-developed” 
countries they overtook. Said argues that Europeans defined themselves by defining the 
“Orientals” who they considered their inferiors. To Europeans, Orientals were simply 
subjects of their study and thus deemed inferior “others” of the East (Said, 1978). In this 
way, the colonizers were “Orientalizing” the people and the land they colonized. In 
other words, colonizers created their own definitions of who these people were based on 
the colonizer’s own sense of western superiority. This produced a paternalistic view of 
Orientals as naïve, pure, ignorant, uncivilized people in need of the guidance of the 
occident, which was used as a justification for colonization.  
Following WWI, Orientalism’s center shifted to the US, and those studying 
Orientalism did so to create policy for dealing with “oriental” countries. The idea of 
“the Occident and the Orient,” “civilized and uncivilized” persisted even after Europe 
lost many of its colonies following WWII (Said, 1978, p. 216). Despite globalization, 
prejudice was just as prevalent. This prejudice existed perhaps most clearly with regard 
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to Islam even as western countries started to perceive other “Orient” countries more 
liberally and with greater tolerance.  
Today, these generalized characteristics attributed to “Orientals” persist 
presently as Arabs are viewed as uncivilized and Islam is associated with terrorism. 
Leela Fernandes points out that US military campaigns in the Middle East, and western 
media portrayals of Muslim women, have perpetuated these longstanding colonial 
narratives (Hesford and Kozol, 2005). Fernandes discusses the ways in which US 
politicians and news commentators used investigations of torture in Iraq and 
Afghanistan during the “war on terror” as a “proof of the superiority of the American 
identity” (Hesford and Kozol, 2005, p. 70). Through such examples, Fernandes 
confirms Said’s notion that “despite its failures, its lamentable jargon, its scarcely 
concealed racism, its paper-thin intellectual apparatus, Orientalism flourishes today” 
(Said, 1978, p. 322). That is to say, though Orientalism has roots in colonialism, it still 
exists in today’s neocolonial and post-colonial constructs and international relations.  
This contemporary form of Orientalism appears in present-day discourse that 
engages Islam through sweeping generalizations, employing “edifying use of the word 
Islam to signify all at once a society, a religion, a prototype, and an actuality” (Said, 
1978, p. 299). In what started during colonization and continues today, there is a pattern 
of thought whereby all actions of individuals in Muslim cultures are associated with the 
culture as a whole and reduced to Islam. This is what Nigerian feminist author 
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie (2009) would describe as the danger of the single story: in 
this case, Islam and individual experiences of Muslim women are used to signify and 
define the whole, when in fact Muslim people are as diverse as the people of any other 
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identity category. While there is such a thing as common identity, representation of 
such identities must be careful to think of identity as a “production which is never 
complete” rather than as an “already accomplished fact” (Hesford and Kozol, 2005, p. 
8).  
Much of contemporary literature about the “Orient” illustrates the ways in which 
assumptions about women, particularly Muslim women, reflect and constitute the 
dominance of western feminism, which in many ways relies on such dangerous single 
stories. Western feminism itself is quite diverse, and exists in response to inequalities 
and challenges that occur in contexts of the west (that Said critiques as being dominant). 
Thus, western feminism has become a dominant notion born from the sense of 
superiority of the west because of “a coherence of effects resulting from the implicit 
assumption of ‘the west’ (in all its complexities and contradictions) as the primary 
referent in theory and praxis” (Mohanty, 1988, p. 61). In defining western feminism, 
Mohanty argues that “assumptions of privilege and ethnocentric universality on the one 
hand, and inadequate self-consciousness about the effect of western scholarship on the 
'third world' in the context of a world system dominated by the west on the other, 
characterize a sizable extent of western feminist work on women in the third world” 
(Mohanty, 1988, p. 63). Western feminism, on one hand, constructs a set of issues  
around which all women are expected to relate, yet also suggests that secular and 
“liberated” women have utter and total control over their only bodies and lives, which is 
also explicitly untrue (Mohanty, 1988, p. 62). These assumptions are often uncritically 
culturally constructed.  
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Similarly, depictions of Muslim women in the west imply a western superiority 
in the idea that Muslim women are in need of help from western governments, 
nonprofits, or other institutions. Many of these notions come from stories of women in 
highly conservative regions of the Middle East (i.e. women banned from driving cars or 
forced to wear the burka). These “single stories” are used to generalize the whole of the 
Muslim world in a dangerous way, causing harmful misperceptions and perpetuating the 
idea that “Muslim women need saving” (Abu-Lughod, 2002, p. 783).  
Anthropologist and author Lila Abu-Lughod maintains that the idea that Muslim 
women need saving is what has caused dangerous consequences in Arab countries 
where women don’t actually need to be saved. In fact, this causes an opposition 
between Islam and the west, between fundamentalism and feminism, which in turn 
forces “those who might want to refuse the divide and take from different histories and 
cultures, who do not accept that being feminist means being Western,” to decide 
between the two (Abu-Lughod, 2002, p. 788). Consequently, if these people decide 
against prioritizing values of liberal western feminism, they are seemingly forced 
towards radicalism because western feminism does not always create space for other 
forms of feminism with non-western cultural contexts.  
Within the western notion that Muslim women need saving, global development 
efforts of governments and NGOs deem women as victims, using a “colonial 
appropriation of women’s voices” to justify their invasion or even best intentioned 
projects in other countries (Abu-Lughod, 2002, p. 785). While these initiatives claim to 
be liberating women, Abu-Lughod argues that we need to be suspicious of this rhetoric, 
which has been especially pervasive since the US invaded both Iraq and Afghanistan, 
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and the tensions surrounding Islam post-9/11. Not only has the US government 
repeatedly portrayed women abroad as victims as an excuse to invade another country 
(and then failed to improve the lives of women in the ways they were marketed as 
promising), but this rhetoric causes us to forget to consider these women as parts of 
reality; as subjects in their own history, not just objects of the west (Mohanty, 1988).  
This rhetoric is what has led to the creation of what Chandra Talpade Mohanty 
calls the “Third World Woman.” Similar to how early colonizers created “Orientals” 
based on their own biased perceptions, the west has created the “Third World Woman,” 
perceived by the west as Mohanty describes: “Religious (read: 'not progressive'), family 
oriented (read: 'traditional'), legal minors (read: 'they-are-still-not-conscious-of-their-
rights'), illiterate (read: 'ignorant'), domestic (read: 'backward') and sometimes 
revolutionary (read: 'their-country-is-in-a-state-of-war; they-must-fight!')” (Mohanty, 
1988, p. 80). This “woman” (purposely singular to illustrate how one depiction is used 
to represent a whole) bears all of the assumptions about women of developing countries 
in an arbitrary construction that “nevertheless carries with it the authorizing signature of 
western humanist discourse (Mohanty, 1988, p. 62). 
In this vein, Mohanty describes how problematic it is to refer to women as one 
assumed group with implicitly coherent identities, priorities, struggles, and needs. Using 
women as a category of analysis implies “the crucial presupposition that all of us of the 
same gender, across classes and cultures, are somehow socially constituted as a 
homogeneous group identifiable prior to the process of analysis” (Mohanty, 1988, p. 
65). It implies universality solely on the basis of a common oppression as a woman and 
assumes a stable category of analysis, without taking into account the varying histories 
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and forms of oppression that exist within this category. It also, again, creates the 
perception of the “woman” – or women – as objects rather than “material subjects in 
their own history” (Mohanty, 1988, p. 65). Lastly, this analytical strategy is both 
“historically reductive and ineffectual in designing strategies to combat oppressions. All 
they do is reinforce binary divisions between men and women” (Mohanty, 1988, p. 73). 
Assuming men as exploiters and women as exploited is a simplistic and generalized 
formula that should be replaced with consideration of patriarchal systems and 
institutions as the oppressor in order to more effectively target the problem.  
Mohanty further argues that these considerations are especially relevant when 
reading the work of western feminists. Because a universal patriarchal structure does 
not exist globally the way western feminism implies, this framework cannot be used to 
analyze feminism outside of the west. Feminisms, and western feminism in particular, 
cannot avoid the challenge of being situated in a global economic and politic framework 
in which one ideology dominates others (Mohanty, 1988, p.  63).  
So how can those grappling with how to understand and speak about a culture 
different from their own deal with these discrepancies? Abu-Lughod suggests the first 
step is to accept the possibility of difference, and the fact that women of different 
cultures might want things for themselves that do not align with what westerners want 
for them (Abu-Lughod, 2002). And furthermore, another step is to not simply justify or 
dismiss any aspects of culture through cultural relativism; rather than excusing 
potentially problematic differences as being “just their culture,” one should actually 
recognize differences “as products of different histories, as expressions of different 
circumstances, and as manifestations of differently structured desires” (Abu-Lughod, 
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2002, p. 789). Abu-Lughod cautions westerners against using the rhetoric of white 
saviorship because of the implications that makes about western superiority: “Can we 
use a more egalitarian language of alliances, coalitions, and solidarity, instead of 
salvation?” (Abu-Lughod, 2002, p. 787). In this framework, it becomes possible to 
recognize how the progress of any culture, including that of the US, can be improved as 
part of ongoing history, not a stagnant perception of culture.  
 
Transnational Feminisms 
The broad understanding of western dominance provided by Edward Said, and 
the arguments presented by authors Lila Abu-Lughod and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, 
among others, help to set up a framework with which to discuss localized feminisms 
such as Islamic feminism in Morocco. This section examines how globalization and 
cultural differences play a role in understanding feminisms in a global context.  
While there are many ideas and definitions of transnational feminism, 
anthropologist Aihwa Ong argues that transnationality should “highlight the ‘cultural 
specificities of global processes’” in order to problematize the role of power within 
globalization (Hesford and Kozol, 2005, p. 14). Feminist scholar Minoo Moallem 
argues that “the survival of feminism…will depend on embracing transnationalism 
rooted in the recognition of various intersecting social relations” (Hesford & Kozol, 
2005, p. 14).  The idea of transnational feminism emphasizes the interdependence of 
local and global, and how cultural differences play a role in the function of specifically 
located feminisms.  
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Another important concept when analyzing diverse forms of feminism is the 
idea that intersecting identities cannot be disentangled from one another, and that 
shapes the way that feminisms function in distinct cultures. In their book Global 
Feminism: Transnational Women’s Activism, Organizing, and Human Rights (2006), 
Myra M. Ferree and Aili Mari Tripp acknowledge this by writing that “intersectionality 
means that privilege and oppression, and movements to defend and combat these 
relations, are not in fact singular. No one has a gender but not a race, a nationality but 
not a gender, an education but not an age” (p. 10). Ferree and Tripp point out that, in 
relation to stereotypes about Islam, “global terrorism and ‘national security’ are also 
increasingly recognized as being intertwined and gendered issues” (p. 13). That is to 
say, also, that women’s rights and national security have become entangled in religion. 
However, within the global ‘war on terror’ rhetoric (that, through western media, 
largely focuses on Muslim populations), western democracies co-opt feminism as solely 
their own when in fact sexism thrives in all contexts:  
The oppression of women is framed as religious, family-based, and a 
threat to (Western) civilization, which is now defined as the champion of 
secular modernity and the value of equal rights for all. Diverting 
attention from the way that women continue to be far from liberated in 
Western capitalist democracies is one discursive accomplishment of this 
strategy, and if it succeeds, it could be a demobilizing factor for feminist 
women’s movements. (Ferree & Tripp, 2006,  p.14) 
Re-framing these concepts outside of ethnocentrism and gaining broader perspectives 
on transnational feminisms can shed light on the diverse ways in which women interact 
with their own intersecting identities.  
According to Ferree and Tripp, feminism can be defined as “a broad goal of 
challenging and changing gender relations that subordinate women to men and that 
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thereby also differentially advantage some women and men relative to others” (Ferree 
& Tripp, 2006, p. vii). In this definition, it is important to recognize that Ferree and 
Tripp make note of the inherent superiority that exists in broadly termed feminism, 
which implies the dominance of what I have previously referred to as western feminism. 
In their discussion of feminism, the authors decenter western views to focus on 
culturally specific feminisms. Considering the history of colonization and orientalism 
that led to cultural dominance, not all women who possess feminist core values choose 
to identify as feminists for fear of aligning with this context of exclusion and prejudice. 
Nonetheless, Ferree and Tripp believe that women “who are struggling to change 
women’s subordination…and [work towards the] goal of empowering women should be 
considered feminist” (p. vii). This distinction sets the definition of “feminist” as 
inclusive of various identities and values, for the purposes of this thesis.  
 
Feminism and Piety 
The topic of religion is a less examined social dimension of mainstream 
feminism, but is an important factor in relation to culturally specific feminisms such as 
Islamic feminism. Saba Mahmood broaches the question of the relevance of Islam in the 
complex relationship between feminism and religion in her book Politics of Piety: The 
Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (2012). In an exploration of piety and 
feminism within Egypt’s social movements, Mahmood questions the western 
conviction, however well intentioned, that other ways of life are “necessarily inferior to 
the solutions we have devised under the banner of ‘secular-left’ politics” (p. xi).  
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In Mahmood’s discussion of Egypt’s Mosque Movement, she notes that this 
movement and the women involved in it occupy what she calls:  
An uncomfortable place in feminist scholarship because they pursue 
practices and ideals embedded within a tradition that has historically 
accorded women a subordinate status…have come to be associated with 
terms such as fundamentalism, the subjugation of women, social 
conservatism, reactionary atavism, cultural backwardness, and so-on – 
associations that, in the aftermath of September 11, are often treated as 
‘facts’ that do not require further analysis. (Mahmood, 2012, p. 5)  
In exploring the role of piety within feminist movements, it is necessary to recognize 
assumptions and find ways to eliminate them.  
Many such assumptions are born from stereotypes of Orientalism, as described 
by Edward Said (1978). First of all, what are some assumptions that westerners hold 
about groups of Muslim women? When considering the common question that (secular, 
western) feminists focus on in relation to Muslim women, one may ask: “why would 
such a large number of women across the Muslim world actively support a movement 
that seems inimical to their ‘own interests and agendas,’ especially at a historical 
moment when these women appear to have more emancipatory possibilities available to 
them?” (Mahmood, 2012, p. 2). This question holds the assumption that “there is 
something intrinsic to women that should predispose them to oppose these practices, 
values, and injunctions that the Islamist movement embodies” (Mahmood, 2012, p. 2). 
But is this assumption valid? Raising these questions makes room for a mindset that 
moves away from making assumptions about a group of people from a strictly secular 
lens, and avoids placing our own biases in the analysis of another culture. It is then 
easier to consider other analytical tools that do not center western values.   
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In much scholarly work from the west about women in Islam, the hijab is a 
central concern, and it is often assumed that the number of hijabi women in a societal 
context directly correlates to women’s oppression in that culture. However, Chandra 
Talpade Mohanty points out that this is an analytically reductive assumption that 
homogenizes and systematizes Muslim women’s experiences in a way that “erases all 
marginal and resistant modes of experience” (Mohanty, 1988, p. 80). We must be 
careful not to assume that this symbol of modesty and respectability universally stands 
for a lack of agency. In western scholarship, there is a notable focus on the hijab. To 
this, Abu-Lughod (2002) notes that “we must take care not to reduce the diverse 
situations and attitudes of millions of Muslim women to a single item of clothing” (p. 
785). Abu-Lughod also notes that “veiling signifies belonging to a particular 
community and participating in a moral way of life in which families are paramount in 
the organization of communities and the home is associated with the sanctity of 
women” (p. 785).  
Just as in any community, Muslim or otherwise, people wear the appropriate 
form of dress that aligns with social standards of the culture, religion, or morals, unless 
purposefully transgressing from any part of those categories (Abu-Lughod, 2002, p.  
785). Moroccan scholar Fatima Sadiqi notes that Moroccan women wearing the hijab 
during the 1990s, a period of increased Islamism in Morocco, was in fact a 
transgression from the trend towards western custom in Morocco. According to Sadiqi, 
for these Moroccan women “the veil is a token of liberation – an indication that they 
have engaged with the Moroccan public in ways that reflect their own sense of religious 
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practice” and was used as a “mechanism for making their presence felt publicly and 
gaining credibility within religious debates” (Sadiqi, 2006, p. 2). 
Understanding that there are varied reasons for which women choose wear the 
hijab, including as an exercise of their own religious expression, helps to underscore the 
importance in analyzing women’s movements within specific localized contexts. Some 
such areas that require deeper analysis when discussing local feminisms are the notions 
of agency, liberty, freedom, and empowerment. These are terms that might not mean the 
same thing to a secular feminist and an Islamic feminist, and the next section elaborates 
on what that difference looks like.  
   
Agency, Freedom, and Empowerment in Cultural Contexts 
A common critique of western feminism is the way in which the western 
feminist movement exports its ideas of individual liberties internationally (historically 
through colonization, invasion, capitalism, etc.). This is problematic because ideas of 
liberty and agency have different meanings based on cultural contexts. Agency, 
according to Mahmood (2012), is “not simply as a synonym for resistance to relations 
of domination, but as a capacity for action that specific relations of subordination create 
and enable” (p. 18). In congruence with the value of locating oneself within culturally 
specific theories of feminism, “the theory of agency must be explored within the 
grammar of concepts within which it resides” (Mahmood, 2012, p. 34). This means that 
agency will vary for women depending on their cultures and traditions. It also means 
that agency is often forced into the binary of subordination and liberation that ignores 
complexities of real human interaction. In relation to women in Islam, the idea of 
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agency as centralized in the moral and political autonomy of the subject seems to be in 
contrast with women belonging to groups related to  “patriarchal religious traditions 
such as Islam” (Mahmood, 2012, p. 7). Thus, it becomes important to challenge “the 
overwhelming tendency within poststructuralist feminist scholarship to conceptualize 
agency in terms of subversion or resignification of social norms” (Mahmood, 2012, p. 
14).  
According to author and human rights lawyer Leti Volpp, certain strands of 
feminist thought depict women of “the third world” as more subject to gender 
subordination than women of the west. This depiction also links women wearing the 
burka or hijab to subordination by men rather than considering other important social 
issues, such as the ways in which western intervention in many Arab countries 
contributes to the levels of poverty (Volpp, 2006, p. 1635). This idea of gender 
subordination versus freedom is, in many ways, a western ideal bound up in a focus on 
gender relations to the exclusion of other issues that might be of more importance to 
women in this context. Often, what is prioritized is the value of individualism, which 
does not apply to all cultures that might center their values on the collective family unit 
rather than individual autonomy.  
Mahmood suggests that we question the universality of women’s desire to be 
free from relations of subordination or structures of male domination, avoiding the 
assumption that freedom is a social ideal that is prioritized in illogical ways depending 
on the context – or that there is only one version of freedom (Mahmood, 2012, p. 10). 
That is not to say that subordination is an accepted norm for women in Islam, it is 
simply to caution against relying on western assumptions, or values prioritized by 
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dominant cultures. Furthermore, it is meant to note that subordination and freedom are 
culturally rooted and have meaning in context. This analysis is not meant to diminish 
the power of liberal feminism’s discourse on freedom and agency, and the positive 
impacts this has had on women’s empowerment in its own context, but rather to point 
out that these ideas are shaped by social and cultural ideas and take on meaning in 
context.  
Mahmood demonstrates the diverse notions of freedom in an example from the 
US in the 1970s. Mahmood argues that during this time, many white feminists viewed 
the institution of the nuclear family as their oppressor and thus chose to reject it, while 
African American and Native American women’s sense of freedom was centered on 
being grounded in their nuclear families – an act of revolt in itself because of their 
histories of separation through genocide, slavery, and racism that “operated precisely by 
breaking up their communities and social networks” (Mahmood, 2012, p. 13). This is 
just one example of how an idea can hold very different significance when culturally 
located. Both of these versions of freedom aid the progress of feminist values but 
through very different notions of freedom. This realization expands feminist 
understandings of freedom and reframes the idea of autonomy as shaped by the 
dynamics of race, social class, and ethnicity.  
Discrepancies in the notions of freedom and agency make up part of the reason 
western cultures view some cultures (Muslim cultures) as stuck in tradition. “What may 
appear to be a case of deplorable passivity and docility from a progressivist point of 
view, may actually be a form of agency,” one that can only be understood within the 
context of those cultural norms and traditions, whether they be religious or societal 
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(Mahmood, 2012, p. 15). One view of agency is not better than the other – to address 
the value and necessity of a specific sect of feminism in the Islamic context is not to 
proclaim it as superior. This is the complexity of global feminisms, and in the context of 
this thesis, the complexity of Islamic feminism in Morocco.  
In her own book, The Politics of Piety (2012), Mahmood’s objective is to make 
her ethnographic study of Egypt’s Mosque Movement   
…speak back to the normative liberal assumptions about human nature 
against which such a movement is held accountable – such as the belief 
that humans have an innate desire for freedom, that we all somehow seek 
to assert our autonomy when allowed to do so, that human agency 
primarily consists of acts that challenge social norms and not those that 
uphold them, and so on. (Mahmood, 2012, p. 5)  
And, while the women’s movements in Morocco differ widely from those in Egypt, the 
framework of exploring diverse notions of “self” and “agency” still helps to 
“denaturalize the normative subject of liberal feminist theory” (p. 33).   
In alignment with the body of work that questions the reliance on western 
feminism and subverts it by placing discussions of feminism in local contexts, the term 
“empowerment” deserves similar deconstruction as the ideas of agency and liberty. To 
frame the conversation about Islamic feminism in Morocco, it is also important to 
develop a definition for the word “empowerment” and discuss some of the varied 
cultural perceptions about the terms from the side of both Islamic feminists and secular 
feminists in Morocco. For some Islamic feminists, the term “empowerment” is often 
viewed as part of the discourse of western feminism that is rejected by Islamic feminists 
due to the connotation of its meaning, and the direct translation of the word into Arabic. 
Because the Arabic word tamkeen, the translation of empowerment, is also directly 
synonymous with the word “enablement,” the word itself has disempowering 
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implications and it is often thought that the word implies the assumption that women are 
weak and henceforth require an outside source to give them power. In an interview with 
Ilyass Bouzghaia of the Center for Study and Research on Women in Islam, he explains 
that empowerment is not a common term within the Islamic context, since it creates a 
relationship between the man and woman that is centered around power and 
competition rather than mercy and compassion, which are the basis for relationships in 
Islam (I. Bouzghaia, personal communication, April 20, 2016).  
On the other hand, Stephanie Bordat, lawyer and founding director of the Rabat-
based nonprofit organization Mobilizing Rights Associations, MRA, which works for 
the legal rights of women in Morocco, creates her own definition of empowerment. Her 
notion of empowerment of women, from a secular feminist point of view, is that it is 
directly related to financial and legal rights, but comes down to “the capacity to make 
elective decisions and to convert them into desired outcomes” (Bordat, Kouzzi, & 
Schaefer Davis, 2011, p. 4). Empowerment, the authors claim,  
…refers to the expansion in people’s ability to make strategic life 
choices in a context where this ability was previously denied to them. 
Changes in the ability to exercise choice can be thought of in terms of 
changes in three inter-related dimensions which make up choice: 
resources, which form the conditions under which choices are made; 
agency, which is at the heart of the process by which choices are made; 
and achievements, which are the outcomes of choices. (Bordat et al., 
2011, p. 5) 
The authors argue that women’s empowerment can be viewed on an individual level as 
well as a collective one. In the individual sense, women’s empowerment can allow a 
woman to gain control over her own life and decisions. On a broader level, 
empowerment can allow “women as a group [to] work together to overcome structures 
that limit them in society, such as in community mobilization for advocacy campaigns” 
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(Bordat et al., 2011, p. 5). In speaking with Bordat in a phone interview, she stated that 
“you cannot have a definition of empowerment based on the principle of someone being 
weaker” (S. Bordat, personal communication, April 29, 2016).  
These definitions allow for a more positive understanding of empowerment, 
which is the one I will be referencing in this study. With this definition, we can view 
empowerment as a constructive opportunity for women; one that neither implies female 
weakness nor relies on the connotation of the word “empowerment” as relating to a 
sense of competition between man and woman, or hierarchal values in the relationships 
of husband and wife. Instead, empowerment for women can mean making societal 
changes that allow women the ability to make their own decisions, and make a positive 
impact on country’s development and progress towards justice, equality, and equity. 
While these notions are challenging to deconstruct within inclusive and diverse 
contexts, we cannot ignore the political framework of feminism and the importance of 
considering the complexities of feminism on the global scale. We also cannot ignore the 
answers to issues women face that we find challenging as western feminists – as Lila 
Abu-Lughod (2002) points out, “we may want justice for women, but can we accept 
that there might be different ideas about justice and that different women might want, or 
choose, different futures from what we envision as best?” (p. 788). Similarly, what does 
freedom mean when we realize that freedom exists within varied social and historical 
contexts, and thus freedom exists in a wide range of meanings and experiences?  
Understanding transnational feminisms and the various forms of agency and 
empowerment aid us in decentering the dominant forms of western feminism, which 
often center only liberal, progressive, white women. These concepts are important to 
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understand in order to continue with the exploration of Islamic feminism in this thesis. 
Similar to how we know that western feminism involves varied ideologies, and just how 
any category as large as “western feminism” cannot be assumed to be homogenous, the 
same is true for Islamic feminism. As this thesis will elaborate, we cannot assume that 
every Moroccan who aligns with Islamic feminism agrees on everything. Using this 
lens, this thesis presents the complexity and diversity of feminism in the context of 
Morocco, keeping in mind that there is no single story.  
 
Islamism, Feminism, and Islamic Feminism 
Islam cannot be viewed as an ideology outside of or separate from social 
relations or practices, but should instead be studied as a discourse that guides social, 
economic, and political settings that vary in complex ways depending on the 
community (Mohanty, 1988, p. 70). For this reason, using Islam as a starting point for 
social reform in Muslim countries that seek to challenge injustices is a logical approach, 
and Morocco is no exception. In the Moroccan context, discussions of social justice are 
closely tied to discussions of religion, especially in regards to gender and women’s 
rights.  
In relation to reform efforts about gender and women’s rights in Morocco, 
scholarly work will often refer to Islamism, secular feminism, liberal feminism, or 
Islamic feminism. While some are much harder to define than others, it is important 
have a general understanding of each term. Saba Mahmood defines secularism as 
“separation of religion from issues of the state, and as the increasing differentiation of 
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society into discrete spheres (economic, legal, educational, familial, and so on) of which 
religion is one part” (Mahmood, 2012, p. 47). Secularism is an important term in 
modern Morocco’s political and social reform. Moroccan scholar Souad Eddouada and 
Renata Pepicelli define liberal feminists as “the organizations that strive to institute 
equality between the sexes by legislative means” (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010, p. 87). 
For example, Eddouada refers to groups in mid-1980s Morocco that devoted activist 
efforts to influencing public policy “towards secularization and the equalization of the 
legal status of men and women,” such as the Union for Feminine Action (UAF) and the 
Democratic Association of Women in Morocco (ADFM). Islamism is often discussed in 
contrast to the various forms of feminism, and is also often equated to Islamic 
fundamentalism or militancy, though it has varied definitions and does not requisitely 
manifest itself in extremism. According to the Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and 
Politics, Islamism at the very least “represents a form of social and political activism, 
grounded in an idea that public and political life should be guided by a set of Islamic 
principles” (Polijarevic, 2015, p. 1). In some scholarly work it is also referred to as 
“political Islam.”  
Lastly, Islamic feminism is a discourse that requires an interpretation of gender 
and Islam through ijtihad, or independent analysis, of Islam’s holy texts (the Quran and 
the hadith) (Badran, 2009, p. 26). However, according to historian and scholar of gender 
in Islam, Margot Badran, “Islamic feminism is not simply a reform of religion and 
society; it is in fact a fundamental alteration towards an egalitarian Islam, which in fact 
makes it distinctly different from secular feminism” (Davids, 2014, p. 313). This is a 
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complicated notion considering Islam and its interpretations and practices vary widely 
from country to country.  
In the Moroccan context, there are no significant disconnects between the goals 
of Islamic feminism and the theories laid out in this chapter. There are, however, some 
tensions between the various parties within Morocco’s women’s movements (i.e. 
secularists and Islamists). Islamic feminism in Morocco is shaped by the country’s 
practice of moderate Islam, as well as Morocco’s recent history of social movements 
and political reform. Before analyzing the specific nature of Islamic feminism in the 
Moroccan context, the following chapter provides the background of women’s 
movements and reform in Morocco that have influenced Islamic feminist discourse in 
Morocco.  
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Chapter 2: Contemporary Historical Contexts of Social Movements in 
Morocco  
The turn of the 21st century has seen dramatic social reform in Morocco that has 
advanced progress through both feminist and Islamist efforts. Islamist movements have 
gained contemporary relevance despite their centuries-old existence and religious 
significance, which has now “marked the era of competing liberal and ‘Islamic’ 
feminism” (Salime, 2012, p. 104). With the strong influence of international movements 
as a result of globalization, as well as internal shifts in power with the death of 
Morocco’s Hassan II to his son Mohammed VI, questions of social reform are on the 
forefront of Moroccan law, politics, and social consciousness. This era brought forth 
issues such as women’s rights within marriage, divorce, inheritance, the workplace, and 
religious authority, among other areas that were met with activism and movements that 
catalyzed this social reform.  
This chapter will cover what researchers identify as some of the principal events 
in recent Moroccan history that influence the way gender relates to religion, and vice 
versa, in Morocco. The first entry point into this discussion is the historical context of 
King Hassan II and subsequent King Mohammed VI’s roles as Morocco’s commanders 
of the faithful, during which time Morocco saw an increase in female participation in 
the political sphere. This chapter will then discuss the ratification of the United Nation’s 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) and what that meant for Islamic feminism, the reform of the Moroccan 
Family Code (the Moudawana), representation of women with religious authority (in 
the form of Mourchidats, female religious guides), and Morocco’s role in the Arab 
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Spring uprising – much of which formed as a response to political movements and 
activism.  
 
Recent Historical Context 
Rapid social and economic advancements have marked Morocco’s recent 
history under the rule of King Mohammed VI, who gained power after the death of his 
authoritarian father Hassan II in 1999. Before Hassan II, French colonial rule of 
Morocco ended in 1956 under the rule of Hassan II’s father Mohammed V, who reigned 
until his death in 1961. Hassan II’s reign was known for human rights abuses in 
unlawful incarceration, torture, exile, and forced disappearance of critics or opponents 
of his rule (Amine, 2016). The current king, Mohammed VI, has made himself known 
for progressive reform, in contrast to Hassan II’s conservative and authoritarian so 
called “Years of Lead” (Amine, 2016).  
By the 1990s, nearing the end of Hassan II’s life, Morocco began to feel the 
global after-effects of the Iranian Revolution and the end of Cold War, both of which 
shifted international power relations – with one giving power to political Islam, and one 
leaving the US as the main global superpower (Sadiqi, 2006).  Along with many other 
Muslim countries during this time, Morocco began to shift towards political Islam, or 
Islamism. This led to multiple changes. On one hand, it undermined the power of King 
Hassan II as the sole religious authority, and it also put into question the efforts of 
western feminists who sought to change the then-conservative Moroccan Family Code. 
This period (the 1990s) saw the rise in participation of highly educated hijabi feminists 
who focused on the importance of religious values in shaping political and social efforts 
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in Morocco. As the number of these women taking action in Moroccan politics 
increased, “the veil became a mechanism for making their presence felt publicly and 
gaining credibility within religious debates” (Sadiqi, 2006, p. 3). It was during the 
1990s, also, in which Morocco’s liberal feminists and Islamic feminists began to find 
ways to compromise on issues that often divide them, such as through increased use of 
Arabic rather than French in official documents (moving away from western colonial 
forces), and rooting discussions in a true knowledge of Islamic scripture (Sadiqi, 2006). 
All of this came at a time of greater democratization in Morocco, with the new, 
young King Mohammed VI in 1999 who is considered Morocco’s “first feminist.” The 
Moroccan state, King Mohammed VI, created efforts towards democratization and a 
quota mandate that saw 35 women take seats in parliament in 2002 (Sadiqi, 2006). 
Asma Lamrabet describes Morocco as a “relative exception” to Muslim countries that 
lack democratic processes and other such factors that she notes lead to radicalism and 
extremism in the name of Islam – something she also notes is doubly challenging for 
Muslim populations: “[extremists] are certainly committed in the name of an ideology 
in complete contradiction to the ethics of Islam, yet the explicit religious claims of their 
perpetrators remain extremely painful for the majority of Muslims” (Lamrabet, 2016, p. 
1).  
Some scholars reference the influence of globalization on the rise of Wahhabism 
(ultraconservatism) in Morocco. During the end of Hassan II’s reign in the 1980s-90s, 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) implemented structural 
adjustment programs, international lending policies that caused painful alienation of 
developing countries. The subsequent vulnerability in Arab countries, like Morocco, 
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made it easier for extremists to disseminate their conservative ideas (Solfrini, 2016). 
Although today King Mohammed VI has used his religious authority to encourage a 
more tolerant, moderate Islam in Morocco, Wahhabi messaging still reaches Moroccan 
families through conservative television programs, particularly targeting rural, lower-
income areas (M. Dao-Sabah, personal communication, April 28, 2016).  
The 2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca, in which a group of teenage boys from 
the slums of Morocco set off five suicide bombs around the city, caused widespread 
concern about possible radicalization in Morocco. Following the attack, Moroccan 
Interior Minister Mustapha Sahel noted that these bombings bared resemblance to 
international terrorist efforts (Terror Blasts Rock Casablanca, 2003). Morocco began to 
crack down on national security as speculation about how to avoid such radicalization 
internally became a serious topic.  
More recently, Morocco has taken its concern for national security to an even 
greater length by banning the sale and production of the burka (Alami, 2017). While 
this is a seemingly highly controversial legislative decision, a very small minority of 
Moroccan woman wear the burka (Alami, 2017). Similarly, while the hijab was, for 
many years, a growing trend for Moroccan women, fewer millennial woman dawn the 
hijab (Alami, 2017). Some argue that the burka is not a part of Moroccan tradition or 
culture, the way the hijab, niqab, or djellaba are (Alami, 2017). While some view the 
ban as justified for the sake of national security, others view it as a breech of women’s 
freedom (Alami, 2017).  
These events, from the increased democratization of Morocco, to the influence 
of globalization and possible threat of religious extremism, are representative of this era 
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of significant social changes in Morocco. Globalization has also influenced Morocco in 
the sense that Morocco has ratified United Nations agreements that hold the country 
accountable to universal law. In the context of women’s rights, the most notable 
agreement that Morocco has ratified is the UN Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination Against Women, or CEDAW. The following section details the 
contentious decision for the country to ratify CEDAW.  
 
Ratification and Reservations on CEDAW 
The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) is a United Nations Treaty adopted by 187 countries in 1979. 
Signatories commit to enforcing international human rights laws for women 
(international laws that only six UN countries, including the US, did not sign). In 1993, 
Morocco originally ratified the treaty with a list of reservations that claimed that some 
of the articles went against Islamic law in the ways they defined gender equality in the 
domestic realm. The reservations submitted were for Article 9(2) which grants equal 
rights for men and women in proclaiming the nationality of their children, and Article 
16 which outlines the principles of gender equality within the family and marriage 
(Zvan-Elliott, 2014). Perhaps most notably, Morocco entered declarations to Article 2, 
which specifically defines the purpose of the Convention by requiring “signatory states 
to institute gender equality in their legal orders, including their national constitutions, 
and urges countries to foster a culture of equality-as such it is recognized as defining the 
object and purpose of the Convention” and Article 15(4), which “specifically regulates 
the individual’s right to freedom of movement and the freedom to choose her residence 
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and domicile” (Zvan-Elliott, 2014, p. 18). These declarations, along with the other 
reservations, confirmed the priority of Islamic Law over international law in 
interpreting inconsistencies in CEDAW and domestic law (Zvan Elliott, 2014).  
It important to note that there are CEDAW articles that address values based on 
assumed biological differences between men and women in the provisions for maternity 
protections and reproductive rights for women (CEDAW articles 4(2), 5(b), 11(2)). 
Professor at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane, Katja Zvan-Elliott, points out the merit 
in this deliberate wording in the CEDAW treaty that addresses biological needs of 
women while making it clear that equality does not requisitely denote identical 
treatment of the sexes. Zvan-Elliott writes:  
Women do not have to be more like men to be equal because human 
rights are not androcentric, in which men would be made to be the 
standard of human experience. In other words, to demand to be treated 
like a human does not mean to be treated like a man. Equality, therefore, 
is not understood as the ‘mechanical equality.’ (Zvan-Elliott, 2015, p. 
93) 
This discussion about regulating women’s rights within the family unit is hugely 
important in the Moroccan cultural context. Because of this, the question of valuing 
equity as opposed to equality in women’s rights is a frequent point of contention. I will 
delve into a wholesome discussion about equity and equality in Chapter 4.  
In 2008, the monarchy withdrew the CEDAW reservations, a move praised by 
progressive liberal feminists in Morocco. However, the declarations on Article 2 and 
15(4) remain (Zvan-Elliott, 2014). Now, CEDAW is meant to be the standard that 
informs human rights and treatment of women in Morocco, and commits the country to 
uphold these international standards. However, some would argue that these standards 
have not been adequately upheld. Zvan-Elliott, for example, also makes a case for the 
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ways in which Morocco has failed to uphold the CEDAW standards to which it has 
committed. By keeping the declarations to two key articles of the Convention treaty, 
Morocco has granted itself leeway in following the international women’s rights 
agreements (Zvan-Elliott, 2014).  
Similarly important for women’s rights is the Moroccan Family Code, or 
Moudawana, which was reformed in 2004. Unlike CEDAW, however, the Moudawana 
is written in the context of Muslim culture and takes into account the teachings of the 
Quran in structuring the laws for fair treatment within the family unit. Nonetheless, the 
reform of the Moudawana opened up conversation between secularist and Islamists on 
the topic of women’s rights within the Muslim family structure.  
 
The Moroccan Family Code (Moudawana) 
In Morocco, the relationship between secular feminists and Islamists has shaped 
and influenced national legislation and social change. For example, the Association 
Démocratique de Femmes du Maroc (ADFM), one of the feminist organizations that 
originally based their political positions on international documents such as CEDAW, 
now evaluates matters such as inheritance from an Islamic perspective (Eddouada & 
Pepicelli, 2010). Similarly, feminist movements influenced some Islamist groups to 
alter their conservative stances on marriage, women in the workplace, inheritance, and 
divorce, which largely affected the Islamists moves to reform the Family Code of 1957 
in the beginning of the 21st century (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010). Following its reform, 
the Family Code is often pointed to as a pillar for the advancement of women’s rights 
from a religious perspective in Morocco.  
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The Moudawana is a Moroccan law that defends women’s rights in the home, 
but not in the public sphere. Reform of the Family Code in 2004, which “institutes 
gender equality, removes the marital guardian and obedience laws, provides women 
with the right to initiate divorce and gain custody of children, abolishes repudiation and 
restricts polygamy” (Salime, 2012, p. 103), made it so that the law is considered to be 
“one of the most progressive codifications of women’s rights in the region” (Salime, 
2012, p. 103). The reforms to the Family Code in Morocco were implemented after 
twenty years of action and discrepancy between feminists and Islamists, including the 
launch of One Million Signatures Campaign in 1992 that fought in favor of the reform 
of the Family Code (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 201). The proposed reforms of the One 
Million Signatures Campaign would have established the equal status of spouses, 
women’s right to initiate divorce proceedings, and the abolition of guardianship and 
polygamy, all of which were based on maqasid al-shari‘a (final purposes of Sharia; 
laws based on texts of Islam) in addition to strict adherence to international laws such as 
the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010). However, the eventual ruling on the part of 
King Mohammed VI to put forth the reformed Moudawana to parliament took into 
consideration both parties’ concerns to present a “the egalitarian spirit of Islam and the 
universal principles of human rights,” according to the King’s royal statement. It did 
not, however, implement all factors laid out by the liberal One Million Signatures 
Campaign (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010, p. 1).  
 In my interview with Dr. Asma Lamrabet, of the Center for Study and Research 
on Women in Islam, she explains that this time of reform, in the early 2000s, was very 
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dangerous for the country because of the separation is caused between the two forces in 
Morocco: Islamists and secularists. King Mohammed VI then had to step in as a 
mediator, creating a committee of experts from fields of economy, sociology, theology, 
nonprofits, and human rights to debate the matter and decide on reforms in a consensus. 
This committee was composed of people with different ideological, religious, social 
values, and took into account a collective ijtihad of religious scholars. Lamrabet stated 
in our interview that this was the “first step for a second life for Morocco,” that 
culminated in one of the most emancipated laws in the Arab world.  
Lamrabet explains that both secularists and Islamists were able to reconcile 
some of their differences, at least temporarily. “They are not friends, I’m not going to 
say that they are friends,” Lamrabet clarifies, “but what I want to say is - since I am not 
part of the Islamic movement, I am just an independent intellectual and I want just 
women’s rights, equality, dignity, emancipation - both the universal perspective and 
Islamic perspective, for me, are not incompatible” (A. Lamrabet, personal 
communication, April 29, 2016). Lamrabet continues, saying that the problem between 
the two groups is not religion, but rather political ideology; with a reformist reading of 
the Quran, religion is no longer a problem. This is proven through the reform of the 
Moudawana and the apparent consensus between secular and Islamic feminists in the 
agreement on a reformed law that is considered “the paradigm case of recent legislation 
based on the shari‘a. It puts into practice, at least in part, the ideas of social justice and 
gender equality advanced by Islamic feminists on the basis of a new reading of the 
Qur’an” (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010, p. 1).  
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However, similar to how CEDAW could not solve all human rights standards 
for discrimination against women, the Moudawana has also not been able to solve 
domestic gender issues. Zvan-Elliott argues that “while the law gives family a more 
democratic and just appearance” after the reform, “the reformed Family Code 
reproduces the traditional idea that women need protection, which denies them 
individuality and autonomy” in the way that it defines the husband’s duties within the 
family structure, particularly as the breadwinner and legal authority (Zvan-Elliott, 2014, 
p. 24). In this way, even with the reforms, the Family Code reinforces a patriarchal 
family structure and “operates as a protective and corrective document rather than non-
discriminatory in the sense of CEDAW’s definition” (Zvan-Elliott, 2014, p. 24).  
Furthermore, domestic violence and general violence against women is a 
rampant issue in Morocco that the Family Code has failed to prevent or protect. 
Stephanie Bordat notes that in 2015, a study from the previous year indicated that over 
62% of women experienced some form of violence in Morocco, much of it perpetrated 
by their husbands (S. Bordat, personal communication, April 29, 2016). In many cases, 
women lack awareness of their rights under both CEDAW and the Moudawana, and 
family courts have proven insufficient and cater to conservative judges who try cases 
based on traditional Islamic values rather than the moderate laws set in place.  
These reforms of the Family Code, along with other agendas presented by the 
monarchy and influenced by such movements, have caused progressive reorientation of 
the Moroccan government in terms of gender equality and women’s rights. 
Unfortunately, many activists would argue that these reforms have not accomplished 
enough in terms of women’s rights. Additionally, however, the reforms have also 
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fostered a state that is much more rigidly structured around sharia law in order to satisfy 
the needs of Islamist groups (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010). As a result, the Moroccan 
government has moved towards what Souad Eddouada and Renata Pepicelli would call 
“Islamic State Feminism.” Eddouada and Pepicelli also argue that, “while it opened up 
immensely beneficial prospects for women…the ‘Islamic state feminism’ that has 
resulted from this process does not necessarily share the objectives of either party” 
(Islamists or secularists) (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010, p. 13).  
While the Moudawana clearly outlines women’s rights in the home and within 
the family structure, women have not been traditionally granted leadership roles in the 
mosque. This is based on traditional interpretations of the Quran. However, this is 
another aspect of Morocco’s women’s movement that has seen advancement in the last 
decade.  
 
Implementation of Mourchidats Throughout Morocco 
Following the 2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca, Morocco, in which 
Moroccan extremists set off multiple bombs throughout the city, it became clear to the 
Moroccan state that it was necessary to “occupy (or re-occupy) the field of religion” in 
order to uphold its stance as a moderate Muslim state (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010, p. 
2). To fend off this radicalization of Islam that was building, the Moroccan monarchy 
pushed another reform of the religious sphere whose main focus was “opening 
recruitment to women for posts of authority in state religious institutions” (Eddouada & 
Pepicelli, 2010, p. 2). This reform, adding posts for female authority within the religious 
field throughout Morocco, led to the creation of institutions for the training of 
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“mourchidats,” or female religious guides in 2006. These training institutions are 
organized as a code of the Moroccan Ministry with the purposeful reorganization of the 
field in order to support women, give them answers to questions they have about Islam, 
and empower their position in society (A. Marjouane, personal communication, April 
16, 2016).  
This reform helps maintain Morocco’s position as a tolerant Muslim country, 
and advance the efforts in alignment with the US “war on terror” and international 
fights against terrorism (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010, p. 2). Additionally, allowing 
space for women to have some form of religious authority made it possible for 
Moroccans to have “autonomous action in the field of Islam,” which is most formally 
represented through fatwa, religious opinion on Quranic texts that is officially by the 
Moroccan Council of Oulema (the highest scientific council) in the vision of unity and 
of god (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010, p. 2).  
According to Adil Marjouane, the government official I interviewed who has 
experience with training both male and female religious guides, he noted that the 
training for mourchidats is extensive; the position is highly competitive. Before entering 
the institute for training, the women seeking to become female religious guides must 
pass an oral exam of 30-40 minutes that involved oral recitation of parts of the Quran 
(A. Marjouane, personal communication, April 16, 2016). The women must then be 
evaluated based on their oral recitation skill, and knowledge of the religious sciences 
(prophetic tradition, Islamic Jurisprudence called fiqh) (A. Marjouane, personal 
communication, April 16, 2016). Along with the requirements of being under 45 years 
of age and being Moroccan, the women also must have a bachelor’s degree at 
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minimum, and have one-third of the Quran memorized (A. Marjouane, personal 
communication, April 16, 2016). Unlike men, who must memorize the whole Quran in 
order to become an imam, or male religious guide and preacher, women must only 
know a third of the Quran. This is because women will never be asked to recite the 
whole Quran, which happens during “Prayer of Night” during Ramadan, the way men 
do, since it is forbidden for women to do so (A. Marjouane, personal communication, 
April 16, 2016).  
According to Marjouane, there are now over 500 mourchidats who have been 
trained since the implementation of this reform, and now practice as female religious 
guides throughout Morocco (A. Marjouane, personal communication, April 16, 2016). 
Along with these women, there are also 36 female theologians who are appointed by the 
King and serve on national councils (A. Marjouane, personal communication, April 16, 
2016).  
Marjouane highlighted that the common questions mourchidats answer are about 
how women should behave in the mosques during prayer time while menstruating, since 
in Islam it is forbidden for women to pray or touch the Quran during menstruation 
(according to some interpretations) (A. Marjouane, personal communication, April 16, 
2016). In these instances, and with these questions, women can go to the mosques to 
seek out a mourchidat, female guides who are spread throughout Morocco to guide 
women in their religion. Additionally, Marjouane pointed out that you can actually call 
the Council of Oulema, set up by the monarchy for the purpose of creating the formal 
and official opinions of the Quran in alignment with Morocco’s Islam, and speak to a 
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female religious guide if requested (A. Marjouane, personal communication, April 16, 
2016).   
The roles of the female religious guides are highly valuable in removing barriers 
of knowledge of Islam and proper practice to Muslim women, which liberates these 
women within their religion by allowing them access to safe spaces for open 
conversation about womanhood in Islam. In relation to the mourchidats, Morocco’s 
Minister for Islamic Affairs, Ahmed Taoufiq is quoted as saying: “their presence was a 
powerful symbol that should encourage other women to become involved in public 
action and debates relating to Islam” (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010, p. 8). Not only does 
the training of these women promote Sufism, a form of tolerant Islam that is in line with 
“Morocco’s Islam” and rejects radical extremism, but they also allow for the use of 
religion to advance gender equality in an Islamic Feminist way (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 
2010).  
Nonetheless, it is clear that secular feminism would reject some of the 
restrictions on female religious guides. While, on one hand, there are verses of the 
Quran that encourage men and women to work together in preaching Islam, or da’wa, 
mourchidats face limitations in their roles based on Islamic law (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 
2010). According to Marjouane, it is forbidden by texts of Islam for a mourchidat to 
actually guide the prayer in Islam due to the biological cycles of women, which, 
according to some interpretations of Islam, prevents women from being able to conduct 
prayer (A. Marjouane, personal communication, April 16, 2016). According to 
Marjouane, if a woman were to recite the calls to prayer or preach in the mosque, she 
would be forbidden from doing the prayers for at least seven days of each month 
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because of her menstrual cycle, which would not be conducive to the roles of an imam 
(A. Marjouane, personal communication, April 16, 2016). Additionally, while the 
accepted role of the man is to be the financial provider within the family, verse 228 of 
Sura 2 (the Cow) states that “Men are more responsible than they,” provides Quranic 
textual evidence as to why the responsibility of imams, to lead the prayer, can only be 
assumed by men; because this verse is interpreted to mean that men have “superior 
intellect and ability” (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010, p. 10).  
In my interview with Asma Lamrabet, she pointed out that the value of 
mourchidats lays mostly within rural parts of Morocco where women have very few 
other female models. She explains that it is “symbolically very important to have a 
woman leading other women inside the mosque. It’s revolutionary, but for a category of 
women” (A. Lamrabet, personal communication, April 29, 2016).  This category of 
women includes women without access to school, women who are illiterate, or women 
who have social problems, while “for women who are going to university, modern 
women, emancipated women, I don’t think that the mourchidats have a very important 
impact” (A. Lamrabet, personal communication, April 29, 2016).  
In the modern and urban cities of Morocco, with educated women who now 
have a reformist perspective on Islam, the mourchidats would have to change their 
speeches in order to have a great impact on women’s rights because their teachings are 
based on classical, traditional discourse. While female religious guides clearly play an 
important role in removing barriers to women in Islam in rural parts of Morocco, some 
would say that their work is not progressive enough to make impactful advancement 
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towards women’s rights in the grand scheme of the country (A. Lamrabet, personal 
communication, April 29, 2016).   
Despite the many victories for women’s rights, including the ratification of 
CEDAW, the Moudawana, and the implementation of mourchidats, the times still called 
for deeper reforms. Moroccans took to the streets in February of 2011 to voice their 
needs in what became known as the 20th of February movement, Morocco’s stake in the 
Arab Spring uprising. The following chapter discusses what effect this movement had 
on the women’s movement in Morocco.  
 
 
The Arab Spring and Constitutional Reform 
Despite the progressive reforms of the Moudawana in 2004, Moroccans 
followed the wave of the Arab Spring in 2011, a people’s movement against systemic 
injustices in the Arab world, which started in Tunisia and spread to other Arab 
countries. While Morocco claims to be one of the most progressive governments in the 
Muslim world, especially after the reform of the Moudawana, Moroccan citizens, 
mostly youth, were riddled with dissatisfaction and the need to air grievances about 
unjust treatment of women and LGBTQ communities, the economic situation for recent 
university graduates, the undemocratic state of Moroccan government, etc. (Salime, 
2012). Unlike the movements that spread from Tunisia to Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and 
Syria, which centered on anti-government protest, Morocco’s uprising called for more 
substantive reform by the government than what had been seen in the pervious decade 
and a more genuine constitutional monarchy (Salime, 2012). King Mohammed VI put 
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together a constitutional committee that was meant to quell civic dissatisfaction and 
respond to the people’s needs. However, the committee still came forward with 
amendments that did not fit the peoples’ demands, as they were not proposed through 
total democratic processes (Salime, 2012).    
The Moroccan government, as a monarchy reigned by King Mohammed VI, 
gives authority to the king as commander of the faithful, head of the Military, and head 
of the state (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010). With these titles, and power that is 
constitutionally protected by articles 19 and 23 of Morocco’s constitution, the King has 
both religious and secular authority over the country, which activists of the 20th of 
February Movement addressed as “the main obstacle to the rise of truly democratic 
institutions and political accountability” (Salime, 2012, p. 102). This is part of what 
prompted a call by the people to reform the constitution following the 20th of February 
Movement. The movement, with a diverse front, required groups to unite in a way that 
forced compromise and unification of the people. The movement itself allowed Islamic 
women’s activists and secular feminists to work together on certain fronts (Salime, 
2012).  
One of the main conflicts between the Islamists and secular feminists was the 
“obvious sign of elitism and co-optation by the state in the [secular] feminist position. 
To several of [the political groups], one cannot speak of women’s rights in the context 
of a constitution that puts religion and the King’s authority above international law” 
(Salime, 2012, p.106). Feminist groups built their activism around a legalistic 
framework that necessitated the involvement of state agents and the King, as 
“arbitrator.” Conversely, other activists groups vouched for the belief that gender 
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equality could only be achieved through the combined efforts of men and women as 
well as the institutions that are accountable for them, since “gender equality ‘should not 
be isolated from the general struggle for democracy and justice for all’” (Salime, 2012, 
p. 107). Within the 20th February Movement, there was pushback against the 
government and the dependence of secular feminism on government entities: “to these 
activists, the feminists’ emphasis on the specificity of ‘women’s issues’ isolated their 
movement and channeled their efforts to state bureaucrats, foreign funds, and, not to 
mention, consultancy and expertise” (Salime, 2012, p. 107).  
Because of these ideals and the goal of the 20th of February Movement to have a 
united front, the movement forced Islamists and secular feminists, both with agendas to 
promote women’s rights in Morocco, to collaborate in order to meet their goals. 
Islamists and secularists consistently disagreed on whether women should be treated 
with “equity” or “equality,” a discussion that will be investigated further in Chapter 4. 
The meaning and importance of “equality” continued to be a point of contention 
between the two groups, and it even forced debate over the slogan “men and women 
have equal rights” which was rejected by Islamist groups, and eventually was changed 
to “men and women are equal in the struggle” (Salime, 2012, p. 109). This continued 
discussion forced broader understanding and discussion of equality in the contexts of all 
of the projects within the 20th February Movement (Salime, 2012). Nonetheless, these 
discussions allowed opportunity for Islamists, some of whom had strong ideals that 
limited their attitude toward working with secular women’s groups, to change their 
perception of secular feminists and come together while still “accepting the parity” 
(Salime, 2012, p. 109).  
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Despite the movement’s emphasis on the relation and compromise between 
Islamists and other groups, Salime notes that, following the 20th of February Movement, 
there began a shift in how the youth of Morocco started to identify. According to 
Salime, this could be considered what is called a “post-Islamist era,” which “marks the 
shift from Islam as a political project to Islam as a site for individual identification” 
(Salime, 2012, p. 104). This marks a unique outcome of the movement, but this shift in 
the self-identification of Morocco’s youth has yet to present a clear impact on today’s 
sociopolitical context.   
Despite Salime’s claims that this movement shifted Morocco towards a post-
Islamic era, it is undeniable that Islam is directly connected to Moroccan politics. 
Among other outcomes of the movement, activists succeeded in voicing their demands 
for constitutional reform. In March of 2011, directly following the 20th of February, 
King Mohammed VI announced plans for constitutional reform through creation of a 
Royal Council for constitutional amendment. In this televised announcement, he 
emphasized the needs for “the institution of equality and gender parity” (Salime, 2012, 
p. 106). Some of Morocco’s leading feminist groups supported this reform, including 
the Association Marocaine des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM), the Ligue Démocratique 
des Droits des Femmes (LDDF), and the Union de l’Action Feminine (UAF) (Salime, 
2012, p. 106).   
In this chapter, I have outlined the ways in which social movements have 
influenced Morocco’s political reforms, such as in the case of the Moudawana, 
implementation of Mourchidats, and constitutional reform. This discussion has also 
shown the ways in which these progressive reforms help to define Morocco’s human 
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rights standards and treatment of women, both according to international law (CEDAW) 
and sharia law (Moudawana). Nonetheless, as I have pointed out in this chapter, there 
are limitations to the full progressive impact of these laws and reforms. Some scholars 
and activists note that they are not progressive enough, while others say that their 
impact cannot be felt by all of Morocco’s people because many communities are 
restricted by traditional views or are simply unaware of their rights under these laws. 
The following chapter examines the work of two organizations that work to further 
disseminate Islamic feminist interpretations of the Quran and implement women’s 
rights efforts at the grassroots levels. 
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Chapter 3: Grassroots Efforts Towards Gender Equality 
Musawah: For Equality in the Muslim Family 
A strong basis for social change exists in Morocco based on the intensive efforts 
to restructure national policy and reinterpret the Quran. However, tensions remain 
between Islamists and secularists in relation to feminism, and there is some disconnect 
between civil society and the political and religious reform. Musawah is an international 
feminist movement that strives to be a middle ground between the legislative reform 
and civil society. While there are many nonprofits and community organizations that 
work towards women’s rights and equality in the Moroccan family, Musawah serves as 
an overseeing organization that partners with local efforts.  
Musawah, which means “equality” in Arabic, launched in 2009 as a global 
movement that reevaluates Muslim family law and centers the rights of women in the 
context of Islam. Musawah started in Malaysia and was hosted by a local Malaysian 
NGO Sisters in Islam. Since then, Musawah has expanded its work as an umbrella 
organization in many other Muslim countries in an effort to advance women’s rights in 
Muslim family law. Musawah serves as a platform for women’s rights in the context of 
the Muslim family unit, and aids local efforts to do so rather than interfering with what 
efforts are already in place (H. Zekri, personal communication, May 5, 2016). The 
movement expanded to the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region by locating an 
office in Rabat, Morocco, in an effort to strengthen ties to Arab women’s movements as 
a continuation of pre-existing international support that now exists at closer proximity 
(H. Zekri, personal communication, May 5, 2016).  
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Houda Zekri, Coordinator of the Secretariat for Musawah, acknowledges that, 
despite Morocco’s strong civil society and the compromises made between women’s 
rights groups, there are still feminist NGOs that focus on international conventions that 
butt heads with the conservative wing of activists. Musawah strives to serve as the 
middle ground between the people and legislation, offering an international platform for 
Muslim countries and does not interfere with local NGOs or efforts, but presents a 
common idea that all of these women share: laws and values informed by Islamic 
tradition. Musawah holds a very holistic approach, and “builds its arguments on Islamic 
tradition, constitutional guarantees of equality and nondiscrimination, international 
standards of human rights, feminist values, and lived realities of Muslim women and 
men” (H. Zekri, personal communication, May 5, 2016). These five elements are the 
basis of the organization’s work.  
Musawah’s work in Muslim countries, including most recently in Morocco, 
relies on progressive interpretations of the Quran and international standards on human 
rights as its two main tools. Musawah operates under the understanding that the 
teachings of Islam are not inherently sexist; they are only seen as sexist because of the 
patriarchal readings traditionally disseminated by male interpreters. Thus, Musawah 
also encourages independent interpretation of the Quran through ijtihad so that women 
can create their own understandings of Islam’s teachings.  
One primary focus of Musawah is to create harmony within the Muslim family, 
which is vital everywhere but is an essential factor for peace and justice in Morocco, 
where family is the “core of society” (H. Zekri, personal communication, May 5, 2016). 
“If you heal the family, you heal society,” Zekri explains. This is also part of the reason 
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Musawah works hard to include men in their efforts for women’s rights and equality. 
The organization’s focus on the Muslim family requires inclusion of men (fathers, 
husbands, brothers, etc.) in the discussion of women’s rights, which is valuable because 
gender equality cannot be achieved without the participation of men. If men are not 
educated on the importance of women’s rights and empowerment through the context of 
the Quran, the more conservative tradition of keeping women in the house and out of 
the public sphere will continue and inhibit positive development for women’s rights in 
Islam. These discussions surrounding women’s roles in the home and in society will not 
only improve women’s rights but also economic development, as women in the 
workforce prove to be valuable assets as innovators, achievers, and workers (H. Zekri, 
personal communication, May 5, 2016). 
Musawah works as an academic and civil society organization, producing 
research on women in Islam, as well as on-the-ground efforts such as international 
advocacy plans and “knowledge building.” Its international advocacy includes working 
with the implementations of CEDAW in the Muslim world, helping NGOs in these 
countries complete shadow reports on issues related to women’s rights that some 
governments use to avoid implementing the articles of these international conventions 
(H. Zekri, personal communication, May 5, 2016). 
Equally important are Musawah’s efforts towards “capacity building,” which it 
prioritizes, knowing that the knowledge it gains as an organization is not useful if it 
does not reach the grassroots level. Through “I-nGEJ” courses (an acronym that stands 
for Islam, Gender, Equality, and Justice, and is pronounced “I engage”), Musawah 
creates the opportunity to link the impressive academic work of the organization with 
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people of civil society, building a bridge that will allow the gender-equal values of 
Islamic feminism to reach the people. During Musawah’s “I-nGEJ” course in November 
2015, participants from multiple countries of the MENA region gathered to discuss 
these subjects related to Islamic feminism, and sparked interesting debates (H. Zekri, 
personal communication, May 5, 2016). 
Zekri states that Morocco is currently on a strong path towards gender equality, 
and has served as a leader for gender justice in the Muslim world through its reforms of 
national legislation such as the Moudawana and the Moroccan constitution that apply 
progressive use of jurisprudence. Nonetheless, there are limitations to the progress. 
There is continued room for improvement, and Musawah strives to serve as a catalyst 
for that.  
Much of the basis for Morocco’s specific form of Islamic feminism is put forth 
by the theological research center that has been mentioned throughout this thesis: the 
Center for Studies and Research on Women in Islam. The following section will 
examine the specific role of this center, how it was started, and what it strives to achieve 
for Morocco’s Muslim population.  
 
The CSRWI and the De-colonial Approach to Islamic Feminism 
In 2006, following the Casablanca terrorist attacks in 2003, the Moroccan 
monarchy created the Rabita Mohammedia al Oulema, or the Mohammedia Association 
of Scholars, a center for religious studies consisting of liberal Moroccan theology 
“associating the ideals of Islam and the egalitarian spirit of universal human rights in an 
effort to reconcile faith and modernity” (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010, p. 8). In 2010, the 
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Rabita Mohammedia al Oulema announced its partnership with a study center for 
women in Islam, which became the Center for Study and Research on Women in Islam 
(CSRWI). This group, headed by theologian and scholar Dr. Asma Lamrabet, presents 
distinct notions of Islamic feminism based on the center’s reinterpretations of Islam’s 
holy texts (Center for Study and Research on Women in Islam [CSRWI], 2015a).  
The CSRWI was established with the objective of creating a “unified front 
against aberration, negligence, extremism and lethargy,” and holds great potential for 
spurring progressive social change in Morocco (Center for Study and Research on 
Women in Islam [CSRWI], 2015b). More specifically, the CSRWI’s goals include 
reinterpreting Islamic traditions through a feminist lens, using “jurisprudential 
reasoning (ijtihad) and final purposes (maquassid)” to reshape Islamic view of women, 
revising concepts of women’s issues in Islam in consideration of contemporary human 
rights standards, correct stereotypes of Muslim women, and construct reformist 
scholarship in the field of women’s studies in Islam (CSRWI, 2015a, p. 1). 
By prioritizing contemporary women’s issues and applying the Quran and hadith 
to a changing reality, the center is able to  “evaluate and revise ideas and concepts on 
women’s issues in Islam in the light of contemporary conceptions of justice and human 
rights” (CSRWI, 2015a).  Through seminars, publications, and journals created to 
encourage discussion and debates by the public on these important subjects, the center 
aims to use their studies and research to disseminate the values of a tolerant version of 
Islam, and openness to the “advancement of human knowledge” (CSRWI, 2015a).    
The center acknowledges that there are many challenges that come with their 
efforts to re-read the Quran. Through their research and seminars, the center works to 
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counteract these challenges. One challenge is that Islam and the Muslim world is 
“dominated by traditional interpretations and overlooked the potential of renewal within 
Islam,” and that there is a “disparity between the Quranic prescriptions of justice and 
equality on the one hand and cultural practices of patriarchy on the other hand” 
(CSRWI, 2015a). Another aspect that the center recognizes as a hindrance to the 
equality of women in Islam is the presence of stereotypes about Muslim women that 
present obstacles in creating space for woman in Islam (CSRWI, 2015a). In an 
increasingly globalized world, where “Islamophobia” (fear of Islam and Muslims) is 
rising, many non-Muslims view Muslim women as oppressed and conservative figures, 
so many outsiders view the objectives of the center as futile or paradoxical. This alone 
hinders constructive action that allows space for Islamic feminism (CSRWI, 2015a).  
However, rereading the Quran through a feminist lens and positioning the 
traditional teachings in a modern context, helps to reduce these obstacles. This 
reinterpretation of the Quran is one of the main objectives of the Center for Study and 
Research on Women in Islam and is the foundation of center’s construction of Islamic 
feminism. This feminism is also known as “Third Way Feminism,” a term coined by the 
director of the center, Asma Lamrabet, which will be discussed in the following chapter. 
The “Third Way” combines religious thought with secular ideals of equality, 
“associating the ideals of Islam and the egalitarian spirit of universal human rights in an 
effort to reconcile faith and modernity” (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010, p. 8). In this way, 
the center has filled a gap that was left by Islamists with limited interest in feminism, 
and liberal feminists with little interest in religion (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010).  
 
 
56  
The CSRWI counters the common assumption that feminism is a solely western 
notion by presenting a form of feminism that aligns not only with ideologies of the 
Muslim world, but also stems from the theology of Islam. By reanalyzing the Quran 
through this Islamic feminist lens, and examining feminism through an Islamic lens, the 
center proposes ways in which Islam and the Quranic texts promote gender justice, and 
in turn promote positive societal change within the Muslim world (CSRWI, 2015a). In 
this way, the center can work against “confusion” that might exist within interpretations 
of the Quran. This can mean presenting alternative interpretations of the Quran that 
specifically address patriarchal viewpoints, but it can also mean addressing the disparity 
between what the Quran says and what is actually practiced in contemporary society 
(CSRWI, 2015a).  
This is an approach that Ilyass Bouzghaia, a lead researcher at the center, refers 
to as the “decolonial” approach to feminism, which is the idea that western notions of 
feminism are not compatible with the whole world. Decolonization does not mean to 
reject western thought completely, but rather to deconstruct and inspect those values 
that were implemented and forced upon the developing countries either during 
colonization or by the growing influence of the western world. Because European 
colonialism and US imperialism presume superiority of west and inferiority of the east, 
it devalues the perspective brought forth by those communities. Because of this, Islamic 
feminism in this sense takes on a “decolonial approach” (I. Bouzghaia, personal 
communication, April 20, 2016).  
The center also serves as a tool for cooperation between Islamist and secular 
feminist groups in Morocco, and proves that the two can reconcile their differences and 
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work together in their movements. Asma Lamrabet’s work with the center strives 
determine how far the Islamic feminist perspective can take Moroccan social issues in 
compatibility with universal rights (i.e. those set out by the United Nations CEDAW). 
From Lamrabet’s perspective, the two are compatible. She says: “I see it now, with my 
work in our center and the contact I have with the Islamic movement and with the 
secular movement: they all want to work with us. So this means that it’s possible” (A. 
Lamrabet, personal communication, April 29, 2016). 
The role of the center in the academic world is much needed, as there is a gap in 
this type of scientific and theological work about Islam. The center works to fill this gap 
through its reformist approach to Islam based on egalitarian Quranic concepts (CSRWI, 
2015a). Through this research and dissemination of their findings that demonstrate 
equality and ethics within the sacred Islamic texts, the Center for Study and Research 
on Women in Islam has begun to promote positive social change for gender justice in 
Morocco. 
Together with Morocco’s social movements and progressive political reform, 
the center has helped to shape Islamic feminism in Morocco. The following section 
explores how Islamic feminism can be defined in the context created by Morocco’s 
reforms and social movements. 
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Chapter 4: Understanding feminisms in the Moroccan Context  
What is Islamic Feminism in Morocco?  
In her article “Muslim Women’s Quest for Equality: Between Islamic Law and 
Feminism,” Ziba Mir-Hosseini (2006), a legal anthropologist and activist, writes:  
It is difficult and perhaps futile to put the emerging feminist voices in 
Islam into neat categories and to try to generate a definition that reflects 
the diversity of positions and approaches of Islamic feminists…They all 
seek gender justice and equality for women, though they do not always 
agree on what constitutes justice or equality or the best ways of attaining 
them (Mir-Hosseini, 2006, p. 642).  
Instead, it is easier to define Islamic feminism by what it is not, which Mir-Hosseini 
argues falls into three categories based on the opponents of Islamic feminism: “Muslim 
traditionalists, Islamic fundamentalists, and secular fundamentalists,” all of whom share 
“an essentialist and nonhistorical understanding of Islam and Islamic law” (p. 641).  
In her article, Mir-Hosseini (2006) asserts that many of the challenges of 
defining Islamic feminism come from misconceptions of Islam itself. She claims that 
what is often missing from western discussions regarding feminists within Islam “is a 
recognition that gender inequality in the old world was assumed and that perceptions of 
women in Christian and Jewish texts are not that different from those of Islamic texts” 
(p. 643). Christianity and Judaism have had little problem translating into the 
contemporary contexts, aside from some more conservative sects. However, critics of 
Islam cannot seem to transfer Islam’s sacred texts into modern times without scrutiny of 
its literal meaning. Islamic feminism strives to show the ways in which present day 
social contexts can shape modern understandings of Quranic texts.  
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On one hand, for some Islamists whose values align with those of common 
definitions of Islamic feminism, the term “Islamic feminism” is itself a redundant 
phrase. For example, Islamist author Asma Barlas argues that Islam and feminism are 
so diverse that it is impossible to make a combination of them both (Barlas, 2002). 
Barlas’ main argument, however, is that Islam does not need feminism, because the 
religion is inherently feminist; if you follow the path of the prophet, you do not need an 
external element for women’s rights (Barlas, 2002). The reinterpretation of Islam that 
many Islamic feminists fight for, to Barlas, brings on a notable debate.  
On the other hand, Dr. Asma Lamrabet, the director of the CSRWI, is one of the 
main religious scholars in Morocco who calls for the rereading of the Quran from a 
feminist lens in order to create what she calls Islamic feminism, or the “Third Way” (A. 
Lamrabet, personal communication, April 29, 2016). Lamrabet believes in the 
importance of interpreting the Quran pragmatically rather than reading the text as static, 
arguing that reinterpretations of Quranic verses that some view as conservative can shed 
light on their progressive meanings.  This is where the rereading of the Quran through a 
feminist lens comes into play; religious scholars provide their feminist interpretations of 
Quranic verses to justify gender equality through Islam. These re-readings can be used 
to promote progressive change through Islam. 
Ilyass Bouzghaia, a lead researcher for the CSRWI, describes Islamic feminism 
as a branch of feminism, in the sense that feminism is an umbrella term that includes 
diverse forms of advocacy for women’s rights whether based on ideology (liberal 
feminism), ethnicity (black feminism), or religion (Islamic feminism) (I. Bouzghaia, 
personal communication, April 20, 2016). In the 1990s, women who are now 
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considered Islamic feminists began investigating the role of women in Islam, and the 
potential of Islam to bring forth women’s rights. Bouzghaia defines Islamic feminism as 
“the claim or demand of defending women’s rights with Islamic religious texts in order 
to reread them …showing something different from patriarchal readings, which 
constitutes the foundation for egalitarian potentials for women” (I. Bouzghaia, personal 
communication, April 20, 2016).  
Mir-Hosseini (2006) goes on to argue that, while “secular feminism in the 
Muslim world fulfilled its historical role by paving the way for women’s entry into 
politics and society in the early twentieth century,” the conflict that emerged, and still 
exists for women in the Muslim world, between tradition and modernity, made it 
necessary for these discourses to be “conducted in a religious language and framework, 
where jurisprudential constructions of gender can be reexamined and the patriarchal 
mandates of fiqh can be challenged” (p. 644).   
 
Islamic Feminism: Equity, Equality, and Justice  
Much of the value of Islamic feminism in the Muslim world relates to its “local 
legitimacy,” as stated by Julie Elisabeth Pruzan-Jørgensen in the DIIS Report on 
“Islamic Women’s Activism In The Arab World: Potentials and Challenges for External 
Actors” (2013). This term of “local legitimacy” refers to the incompatibility of secular 
or western feminism in the Muslim world, which brings forward the value of feminism 
in an Islamic context, taking into account Islamic principles and Quranic interpretations. 
At the beginning of the movement for women’s rights in Morocco, secular feminists 
based their demands on international human rights laws and principles, largely in 
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relation to reforms on the Moroccan Family Code (Moudawana), which linked “the 
notion of women’s rights in public opinion with the abandonment of Muslim culture 
and its replacement by a supposedly egalitarian western one” (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 
2010, p. 3). This idea that secular feminism was the only route for women’s rights in 
Morocco was limiting and incompatible with Moroccan culture, and Islamist activists 
for women’s rights began to push back. In reference to Islamic women’s rights activists, 
Pruzan-Jorgensen (2013) notes that “they oppose their inherent secularism, 
individualism and aspiration towards equality (as opposed to equity) – and they strongly 
oppose attempts to have it imposed on them” (p. 6). This relates back to the idea of 
varied denotations of agency in different cultures, and the fact that not all cultures view 
women’s rights as synonymous with individual liberties, etc.  
One of the biggest discrepancies between Islamic feminism and secular, western 
feminism is the value of equity versus equality. For many Islamic feminists, though not 
all, equity and complementarity are valued above equality, which is considered a 
secular concept that would require “the renunciation by women of their biological and 
social roles” (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010, p. 10). Merieme Yafout, one of the past 
leaders of Morocco’s Justice and Spirituality Organization, along with many other 
conservative Islamic feminists, prefer to use the term “justice” even over equity, 
insisting that “the solution to women’s suffering is in bringing about justice and not 
equality” (Zvan-Elliott, 2015, p. 91). Yafout defines justice as when “‘a woman has 
respect, dignity, to have the right to participate in all areas of society – in the economic, 
political, associational areas, in all fields” (Zvan-Elliott, 2015, p.91). Zvan-Elliott points 
out that “the Islamists continue to ‘biologicize’ the social, and it is for this reason that 
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for them women cannot escape their reproductive capacity, which decidedly 
distinguishes them from men and invalidates the issue of gender equality” (Zvan-Elliott, 
2015, p.93). On the topic of motherhood, Yafout argues that the demand for gender 
equality trivializes the roles of mothers, whereas it could be argued that some secular 
feminists view the focus on women within the home as devaluing their roles in society 
as a whole (Zvan-Elliott, 2015).   
Many criticisms of sexism in the Quran point to the roles of men and women in 
the home and the apparent superiority of men over women in certain interpretations. 
However, as discussed previously in this thesis, women’s roles in the home do not 
necessarily equate to women’s oppression or subservience. For many Islamic feminist 
scholars, this question calls forth the discussion of complementarity, in that the role of 
the woman as the caretaker of the family is a responsibility to be proud of, not a 
denigrating role that forces women to stay inside the home (Pruzan-Jorgensen, 2013). 
The duties of child rearing and taking care of the family and home are often “the most 
cherished and central unity of Islamic society” (Pruzan-Jorgensen, 2013, p. 8), which 
shows that the role of the woman as a mother and wife can be culturally important. The 
idea is that the woman can also engage in society as she is not confined to the home.  
While many Islamic feminists argue for equity over equality, Nadia Yassine, 
also one of the leaders of the Justice and Spirituality Organization who considers herself 
“an intermediary” between western and Moroccan cultures, argues that while many 
Islamic feminists use the idea of complementarity and equity in discussion of gender 
roles, “they are in fact talking about equality” (Zvan-Elliott, 2015, p.90). While Yassine 
prefers the idea of equality over equity, and hopes for Morocco to seek a path towards 
 
 
63  
this ideal, she stated in an interview with author Katja Zvan-Elliott that she thinks 
“‘there should be absolute equality, but as an intermediary we need to convince people 
[about this] by using our own words…because words are dangerous in our culture and 
because people are very sensitive towards them’” (Zvan Elliot, 2015, p. 90). Perhaps, 
Yassine is implying that, with time, Morocco will accept the secular idea of equality 
over equity.  
In my interview with Asma Lamrabet on the issue of equity versus equality, she 
states that while she uses both terms, she does not use the term “complementarity,” as 
many Islamists do, “because for me it is subordination; when you say ‘we are 
complementary,’ it means that one of the couple is going to be subordinated”  (A. 
Lamrabet, personal communication, April 29, 2016). Lamrabet adds that, above all, 
there is “another concept that is very important, and we can’t talk about equality or 
equity without it. It’s ‘justice.’ So we have equality, equity, and justice. These three 
concepts have to be together. Because you can have equality but not justice. Justice is 
the core concept” (A. Lamrabet, personal communication, April 29, 2016). With this 
notion, she explains that to her, both sides are wrong when they choose to use just one 
of the terms, because both are valid and both are necessary.  
Lamrabet uses the term of “positive discrimination” to explain the reasoning for 
times when women require more rights than men in a way that is unequal but is just still 
just. For example, when a woman gets pregnant and requires extra time off of work, she 
requires more rights than the man in this situation. To this, Lamrabet states that “this is 
not equality; you can’t have equality with the men in this field. He is the man, he must 
have a responsibility, but the baby needs the mother. So equity and justice here is more 
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comfortable” (A. Lamrabet, personal communication, April 29, 2016). Nonetheless, 
Lamrabet maintains that in most political issues, equality is most necessary and most 
just. In response to those caught up in the conflict between the two terms, Lamrabet 
argues that “they have to understand that our contexts are complex, and our lives are 
complex, and women’s rights are complex, so we need equality, we need sometimes 
equity, we need, always, justice” (A. Lamrabet, personal communication, April 29, 
2016).  
From a secular feminist perspective, the focus on equity over equality limits the 
woman to her role in the home. Zvan-Elliott goes on to argue that “seeking justice and 
fairness – or equity – should not be the end goal because compared to equality, equity is 
a subjective notion not associated with human rights, which can have different 
meanings according to context and does not require state intervention” (Zvan-Elliott, 
2015, p.92). Within the Moroccan discourse on feminism, both socially and 
legislatively, this is a common theme: women are often only referred to through their 
role in the home and not as their role as human beings in society.  
While in some ways this reliance on defining women within the household can 
appear damaging to women’s role in society, it is also true that many Moroccan women 
find empowerment in their role as wives and mothers. Chandra Talpade Mohanty 
elaborates on women’s role in the family unit, describing how “while on the one hand 
women attain value or status within the family, the assumption of singular patriarchal 
kinship system (common to all Arab and Muslim societies, i.e. over twenty different 
countries) is what apparently structures women as an oppressed group in these 
societies!” (Mohanty, 1988, p. 70). The role of women within the home alone should 
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not qualify them as an oppressed group. However, many Islamic feminist scholars 
maintain that while women’s roles within the family unit are valuable and can be 
empowering, the lack of consideration of women’s roles in the public sphere can be 
disempowering.   
Conflict between secular feminists and Islamic feminists about equity versus 
equality seems to be all about semantics of language and definition. As Nadia Yassine 
points out when she describes how many Islamic feminists who favor equity are often 
also describing equality without knowing it, it is possible that there are fewer 
differences than it appears and that the two movements (secular and Islamic) can have 
positive effects on each other (Zvan-Elliott, 2015).  
Some scholars within Islamic feminism argue that finding a common ground 
between secular and Islamic feminism could be an important factor in the progression 
of women’s rights movements and female empowerment on a global level. There are 
many contemporary historical instances in which feminists have influenced Islamists in 
Morocco, and vice versa. For example, feminist movements influenced Islamists to alter 
their positions on marriage, women in the workplace, inheritance, and divorce, which 
largely affected the Islamists more progressive reforms of the Family Code in the 
beginning of the 21st century (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010). Additionally, as previously 
mentioned in the discussion of the Moudawana, the feminist Association Démocratique 
de Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) that originally based their political platforms on 
international legislation like CEDAW now evaluates some central concerns from an 
Islamic perspective (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010).   
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While both are valuable in their own cultural setting, the culmination of the two 
as movements, while still separate, can positively impact the other. As an advocate for 
how Islamic feminist activists can positively influence western movements in the Arab 
world, Julia Elisabeth Pruzan-Jorgensen (2013) states that Islamic women’s activists 
also constitute “potentially important future partners for external actors (bilateral and 
multilateral aid agencies, women’s organizations etc.) working to contribute to Arab 
women’s empowerment, participation, agency and authority” (p. 5). She also describes 
Islamic women’s activism as “an important complement to traditional liberal/secular 
women’s activism,” largely in part because of its “wider local legitimacy,” which shows 
how Islamic feminism can make liberal feminism more inclusive to pious women 
(Pruzan-Jorgensen, 2013, p. 5).  
Islamic feminism is a valuable tool for progress in women’s rights in the 
Muslim world and Morocco, because it is embedded in Islam and Islam’s sacred texts in 
a way that promotes gender justice without trying to eliminate Islam’s role in some 
aspects of Moroccan culture.  
For the theologians at the Center for Study and Research on Women in Islam, 
one of the main tools for interpreting the religious texts from a feminist perspective is 
that of ijtihad, or independent interpretations of the Quran and Hadith. This practice is 
what allows the interpretations of the CSRWI to center women in their readings of the 
sacred texts. The following chapter explores what the concept of ijtihad means in 
practice and how it is applied to some verses of the Quran, according to the theologians 
of the CSRWI and other scholarly work.  
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Chapter 5: Islam’s Holy Texts and Interpretations of the Quran 
Islam, as a religion and laws derived from the holy Quranic texts, is based on 
interpretation. Such interpretations of the religion are what provide the framework of 
Islamic feminism. Ijtihad is defined as the process of making decisions about Islamic 
Law based on independent interpretations of the Islamic texts (the Quran and hadith) 
and should be used to reanalyze the Quran from individual perspectives, according to 
many Islamic feminists (Codd, 2015). Ziba Mir-Hosseini also contends that there is a 
stark difference between religious faith and the institutions and laws that make up 
organized religion. Mir-Hosseini writes that: 
…the result is the pervasive polemical and rhetorical trick of either 
glorifying a faith without acknowledging the horrors and abuses that are 
committed in its name or condemning it by equating it with those abuses. 
Of course, religious faith and organized religion are linked, but they are 
not the same thing, as is implied by conflating them in the label ‘Islamic’ 
or ‘religious’ (Mir-Hosseini, 2006, p. 632).  
This conflation of ideas, without consideration of religion’s personal significance, is 
why the idea of implementing ijtihad into religious practice is vital to a reformist 
approach to religion, such as Islamic feminism.  
In addition to understanding ijtihad when discussing interpretations of Islam, it 
is also necessary to understand the distinction between sharia and fiqh. Mir-Hosseini 
(2006) differentiates between the two in the following explanation: 
In Muslim belief, sharia—revealed law, literally “the way”—is the 
totality of God’s will as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. Fiqh—the 
science of jurisprudence, literally “understanding”—is the process of 
human endeavor to discern and extract legal rules from the sacred 
sources of Islam— that is, the Koran and the Sunna (the practice of the 
Prophet, as contained in hadith, Traditions). In other words, while the 
sharia is sacred, universal, and eternal, fiqh is human and—like any other 
system of jurisprudence— subject to change. Fiqh is often mistakenly 
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equated with sharia, both in popular Muslim discourses and by 
politicians and academic and legal specialists, and often with ideological 
intent… (Mir-Hosseini, 2006, p. 632) 
Most importantly, in her description of the two, she argues the following: 
I contend that patriarchal interpretations of the sharia can and must be 
challenged at the level of fiqh, which is nothing more than the human 
understanding of the divine will, that is, what we are able to understand 
of the sharia in this world at the legal level. (Mir-Hosseini, 2006, p. 633) 
This means that, with this understood ability to interpret the Quran, Islamic feminists 
can use (re)interpretations of the text to prove that gender justice exists within the 
verses. This is why ijtihad is consistently referenced by Islamic feminists. Using ijtihad, 
religious scholars, such as those working in the Mohammedian Association of Scholars, 
and the CSRWI, analyze and occasionally reinterpret verses of the Quran to better fit 
the modern context. This will be further discussed in the following section.  
 
Reanalyzing Contentious Verses  
Using the tools of interpretation, scholars and theologians such as those at the 
CSRWI address the contentious verses of the Quran. That is to say, these scholars 
highlight verses of the Quran that receive attention from secularists for being 
particularly patriarchal and discuss the ways in which these verses can be read through a 
feminist lens. Some of the most contentious verses are about inheritance, guardianship 
(or qiwama, which denote the man as the guardian of the woman), polygamy (in which 
a man is able to take up to four wives), and divorce. While these can be reinterpreted 
through reformist readings, women’s rights in regard to marriage, divorce, and 
polygamy are protected under the Moroccan Family Code, the Moudawana. 
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Specifically, the reform of the Family Code raised the age of marriage to 18, gave 
women rights by law in polygynous marriages, and gave women the right to divorce her 
husband, among other things (I. Bouzghaia, personal communication, April 20, 2016). 
While the interpretations of these verses vary from individual to individual, this section 
discusses some of the responses to these predicaments that lay within the words of the 
Quran, based on the interpretations of Islamic feminist scholars. 
In my own interview with Asma Lamrabet, she emphasized the fact that 98 
percent of the Quran is about equality and justice between men and women, which is 
central to the universal values in the text. Both the Quran and the hadith make clear 
reference to the equality of men and women, such as the line from verse 1 of the Sura 
Al Nisa (The Women) of the Quran: “O mankind, fear your Lord, who created you from 
one soul and created from it its mate and dispersed from both of them many men and 
women” (CSRWI, 2015a). Similarly, the Prophet Mohammed is cited in the hadith as 
saying “Women are the twin halves of men" (CSRWI, 2015a). Nevertheless, critics of 
Islam focus on the 5-6 verses that, when read literally, can be perceived as preaching 
inequality of the sexes. These verses answer to the contexts of the seventh century, 
historical Quranic times, when women were seen as inferior in many civilizations, 
according to literature from that period (A. Lamrabet, personal communication, April 
29, 2016). The idea of Asma Lamrabet’s work in Islamic feminism is to put these 
notions from the Quran into present day civilization and context.  
For example, the ideas of inheritance and guardianship are some of the many 
concepts of the Quran that Lamrabet reanalyzes based on today’s context. This is 
relevant to Verse 35 of Chapter 4 of the Quran titled Al-Nisa (The Women), which 
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states “men shall take full care of women with the bounties which God has bestowed 
more abundantly on the former than on the latter” (Mahmood, 2012, p. 65). This 
explains the notion of qiwama, which is the concept of guardianship or protection, and 
is also the reason that men get twice the share of the inheritance as the woman based on 
the teachings of the Quran (A. Lamrabet, personal communication, April 29, 2016).  
In an analysis of the verse from the Quran, Al-Nisa (The Women) (Al-Quran, 
Sura 4, Verse 34), regarding inheritance in which men are given two shares compared to 
one for women, it is clear that the man is entitled this amount because of his obligation 
to then provide for the family financially (Pruzan-Jorgensen, 2013). In this notion of 
men providing for the family, there is a distinction between “taking care,” (ri’aya), 
which has superior connotations, and “maintenance,” (i’ala), which denotes a more 
mutual effort within the home (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 2010, p. 6). The Renewal of 
Woman’s Awareness, a women’s association founded by Morocco’s parliamentary 
group the PJD (Justice and Development Party) states that “if a man is able to support 
his family, a woman should not work outside of the home. Housework should be 
formally recognized as an economic activity related to development and should 
therefore fall under the rubric of “profession” on identity cards” (Eddouada & Pepicelli, 
2010, p. 6), henceforth legitimizing women’s role in the home.  
Lamrabet says that there are two main points to keep in mind about this concept. 
The first is that it is actually something that was revolutionary at the time, because no 
text prior to the Quran gave women any right to inheritance. The second point is to 
consider that the Quran gives women only half of what men get because, at the time, 
men had all economic responsibility and were expected to provide for the family with 
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the money he received. When the Quran was written, this stipulation was fair and just, 
because the inheritances given to men were intended to be used for maintaining the 
entire family, including the sister who received a small share. This smaller share given 
to the sister was meant to be her own money that she was free to use, since women in 
this time had limited responsibilities (A. Lamrabet, personal communication, April 29, 
2016). Because of these factors, the verses of Sura 4 that stipulate men’s double 
inheritance and guardianship over women are unequal, but they are just in the historical 
context (A. Lamrabet, personal communication, April 29, 2016). In the context of 
Quranic times and the social dynamics of that period in history, according to Lamrabet, 
this solution is fitting. 
However, Lamrabet argues that within the context of the 21st century, this direct 
interpretation of the Quran is no longer just or equal. It can’t be considered just or equal 
because “man is not the head of the family, he can’t be. And women are working; 
women are the head of families, so now the verse is unequal and unjust in our context. 
So now we have to go and to be just, and to be just is to give the same part” (A. 
Lamrabet, personal communication, April 29, 2016). With a critical eye, and unafraid to 
point out the flaws that exist in literal readings of the sacred texts, Lamrabet also urges 
people to remember that “these verses are not trying to say that the women are inferior, 
they’re just trying to answer to the contexts” (A. Lamrabet, personal communication, 
April 29, 2016).  
In my interview with Manal Dao-Sabah, a Ph.D. candidate working on a 
dissertation on Islamism in Morocco, she points out that one of the biggest limitations 
to the success of Islamic feminism as a movement is the “weak hadith,” which many 
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Muslims use as a source of guidance in addition to the Quran (M. Dao-Sabah, personal 
communication, April 28, 2016). The hadith is a collection of traditions based on 
sayings, actions, or behavior of Mohammed, collected by various narrators. A hadith 
can be classified as “weak” if it is not confirmed to be from the Prophet himself, and 
occasionally weak hadith suggest that women lack in areas of religious knowledge and 
mental capacities, implying disrespect towards women in the modern context (M. Dao-
Sabah, personal communication, April 28, 2016). People often get stuck on the subject 
matter of these hadith, which Dao-Sabah argues should be overcome through the vital 
practice of ijtihad; theologians should be taking responsibility to interpret these hadith 
in a way that takes into account contexts of the 21st century and “carries out the 
messages of equality and justice in the Quran” (M. Dao-Sabah, personal 
communication, April 28, 2016).  
Lamrabet elaborates on the limiting factors of weak hadith by pointing out that 
when reading the hadith, it is important to remember that these accounts of 
Mohammed’s life and teachings might be false. Weak hadith are not considered 
“authentic,” since they are written by various observers of the Prophet’s life and are 
based on words that the prophet said centuries ago, that do not apply to our world today. 
Unlike the Quran, which is considered holy and therefore untouchable, hadith can be 
altered and reformed (A. Lamrabet, personal communication, April 29, 2016). Lamrabet 
says that the Quranic texts should be interpreted according to the understanding that 
Mohammed was always respectful towards women, defended women’s rights, and 
worked to change the patriarchal society of his period (A. Lamrabet, personal 
communication, April 29, 2016). 
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These understandings of the Quran and hadith are the basis for how 
reinterpretations shape the goals of Islamic feminism from a theological perspective. 
While the CRSWI is able to disseminate its findings to the scholarly community, other 
organizations like Musawah find ways to take action towards gender justice within the 
Moroccan home. Combined, such initiatives are paving the way towards feminist 
understandings of Islam throughout Morocco.  
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Conclusion 
Local feminisms give women more freedom to define their values on their own 
terms. In the case of Islamic feminism in Morocco, this means that Muslim women do 
not have to choose between religion and gender equality. By decentering the dominant 
discourse of western feminisms, and looking at the discussion of transnational 
feminisms from a pluralist perspective rather than a universalist one, we can see the 
vibrant and diverse offerings of local feminisms. Islamic feminism in Morocco is one 
example of such localized feminisms. 
Throughout this examination of Islamic feminism in Morocco, I have identified 
overarching themes that have presented themselves as principal to the success of the 
movement. First is the importance of independent interpretations of the Quran through 
ijtihad that allow for feminist readings of Islam’s sacred texts. Since Quranic 
interpretation affects how laws are written and implemented in many Muslim countries, 
including Morocco, these progressive readings have helped promote policy reform in 
legislation that has historically marginalized women. Second is the importance of 
understanding the value placed on the family unit and roles within the family as an 
integral part of Moroccan culture, and approaching gender justice through such 
framework.   
Locating this discussion on Islamic feminism in the specific context of Morocco 
draws attention to the importance of the women’s movement in expanding gender 
justice in the country. However, my research for this thesis also highlighted the 
limitations that the movement faces. Some researchers of Islamic feminism, such as 
Manal Dao-Sabah, argue that the Moroccan state could be doing more to affect change 
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and progressive reform based on women’s re-readings of the Quran (Manal Dao-Sabah, 
personal communication, April 28, 2016). Asma Lamrabet touched on another 
weakness during my interview with her, when she noted that female religious guides are 
most impactful in rural areas where women are illiterate and therefore unable to practice 
Islam through their own readings and interpretations. Instead, these women in rural 
areas rely on the Mourchidats (female religious guides) who often disseminate more 
conservative and traditionalist interpretations of the Quran. Dao-Sabah contends that 
educational programs and more progressive media are important steps in counteracting 
the conservative, patriarchal interpretations that are disseminated in rural parts of the 
country. Programs educating women would not only allow them to read and interpret 
the Quran, but it would also help women understand their rights under the reforms of 
the Moudawana and the reformed constitution.  
 Education and capacity building are valuable solutions to overcoming these 
limitations within Islamic feminism. While literacy is one important factor in this, 
spreading awareness and understanding of the inherent gender equality in Islam at the 
grassroots level is also important. One example of this is Musawah’s work in 
strengthening the family unit through their capacity building “I-nGEJ” sessions and 
involvement of both men and women in discussions about equality also helps to 
encourage traditionalists to practice ijtihad rather than relying on outdated Quranic 
interpretations.  
Localized feminisms such as Islamic feminism in Morocco should be celebrated 
for the ways they empower communities. However, as with any subject of analysis, 
 
 
76  
there are also areas that are lacking recognition or acknowledgement within the 
narrative. I have identified some of these areas to address more critically.  
One area of critical analysis relates to the limitations of describing progressive 
readings of the Quran as strictly “feminist.” At the beginning of this thesis, I proposed a 
working definition of the term “feminism,” which uses Ferree and Tripp’s notion that 
feminism is “a broad goal of challenging and changing gender relations that subordinate 
women to men and that thereby also differentially advantage some women and men 
relative to others” (Ferree & Tripp, 2006, p. vii). In noting that anyone “struggling to 
change women’s subordination…and [working towards the] goal of empowering 
women” is a feminist, this definition broadly includes people of diverse value systems 
and identities (Ferree & Tripp, 2006, p. vii). Thus, using this working definition, the 
interpretation of Islam’s sacred texts through a “feminist” lens is not exclusive or 
limiting when applied correctly (i.e. justly, equally, and equitably).  
However, it cannot be ignored that there are people who reject the term 
“feminism” because of the implication that it inherently signifies western feminism and 
the hegemonic stances expected thereof. Similarly, feminism also has the connotation of 
assuming men as exploiters and women as exploited, without taking into account the 
patriarchal institutions and systems that actually serve as the oppressor. This simplistic 
view of feminism deters many people from using the term. Thus, not all those who 
possess feminist core values  identify as feminists for fear of aligning with this context 
of exclusion and prejudice. This is true for scholars such as Asma Barlas, who – 
considering the diverse definitions of agency, freedom, and empowerment within the 
framework of transnational feminism that I proposed in Chapter 1 – aligns with the 
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definition of feminism, yet rejects the term. Because of this, I speculate that deeming 
these progressive readings of the Quran as “feminist” could unintentionally deter 
Moroccan Muslims from considering and accepting such interpretations. Through my 
research, I observe that this is something that the discourse on Islamic feminism does 
not fully recognize.  
I suggest that it could be beneficial to reframe the discourse about 
reinterpretations of the Quran from a strictly feminist discourse to one about equity, 
equality, and justice in society as a whole. This discussion would still include equity, 
equality, and justice in terms of women’s role in the family unit and public sphere, but 
would expand its focus to highlight the positive impact of ijtihad in terms of general 
human rights dilemmas, democracy, economic development, and other concerns of 
peace in Morocco.   
 Moreover, the Islamic feminist discourse is very much rooted in the theological 
sciences and focuses somewhat narrowly on scholarly interpretations. From my own 
analysis, this can lead to a disconnect between the research centers that produce such 
work, and the citizens who could benefit from receiving the findings of these 
progressive theologians. While there are organizations that strive to bridge this gap, 
such as Musawah and its local partnering NGOs, I identify this as another aspect of 
Islamic feminism that makes it inaccessible and exclusive.  
As I have emphasized previously in this thesis, Islamic feminism is not the only 
branch of feminism that exists in Morocco. This thesis only covers what scholars in 
Islamic feminism identify as central to their work. It is important to note that the 
dialogue about Islamic feminism is currently very much rooted in women’s role in 
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society and in the home, often in the context of motherhood and wifehood. This means 
that the discussion does not venture outside of the realm of heteronormative discourse. 
This is the case, in part, because the theological research of Islamic feminism focuses 
on the binary of men and women in heteronormative family structures, and how the 
Quran can encourage equality and justice within those dynamics. That is not to say that 
there is not a movement in Morocco that centers the LGBTQ community. Future areas 
of feminist activism and scholarship require growth, including the potential 
interpretations of Islamic feminist movement on LGBTQ rights. The relationship 
between Islamic feminism and LGBTQ rights is something that I am interested in 
exploring in further research. 
Nonetheless, future and present movements within Islamic feminism in Morocco 
prove valuable to empowering women’s senses of agency and freedom in their own 
localized meanings. Through social movements and legislative reform, Morocco’s 
Islamic feminism has helped to shape gender justice for Muslim women. Moreover, this 
social change and subsequent empowerment of women makes for a more equal society 
for all genders.  
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Glossary  
Burqa: also written “burka”; long, loose fitting garment that covers the whole body 
from head to feet, worn by some Muslim women in public 
 
CEDAW:  Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (UN treaty first signed in 1979 by 187 countries, now including Morocco but 
excluding the United States) 
 
CSRWI: Center for Study and Research on Women in Islam 
 
Djellaba: Loose fitting hooded cloak worn by both men and women in Morocco and 
other Arab countries  
 
IRB: Institutional Review Board (formal committees designated to review and monitor 
biomedical and behavioral research involving human subjects) 
 
Feminism: “Advocacy of equality of the sexes and the establishment of the political, 
social, and economic rights of the female sex; the movement associated with this” 
(OED)  
 
Fiqh: Islamic Jurisprudence, or “human (scholarly) understanding of divine law” 
(Altiok, 2015, p 1).  
 
Hadith: “the authoritative record of the Prophet’s exemplary speech and actions” 
(Mahmood, 2012, p. 201) 
 
Hijab: veil or headscarf worn by some Muslim women in public  
 
Ijtihad: Jurisprudential reasoning, or independent analysis of Islam’s holy texts (the 
Quran and the hadith) (Badran, 2009) 
 
Imam: Male religious guide  
 
Islam:  “The religious system established through the prophet Muhammad; the Muslim 
religion; the body of Muslims, the Muslim world” (OED) 
 
Islamic Feminism: A cross-section of Islam and feminism meant to bring together the 
common points of Islamists and feminists in the form of a movement or ideology, using 
historical contexts and interpretation of the Quran.   
 
Jurisprudence: “the theory or philosophy of law” (OED) 
 
Moudawana: Moroccan Family Code   
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Mourchidat: Female religious guide  
 
Muslim: “n. A follower of the religion of Islam; adj. Of or relating to Islam, its 
followers, or their culture” (OED) 
 
Muslim Feminist: The distinction here between Islamic feminists and Muslim 
feminists is that Muslim feminists can be secular feminists; due to Morocco being a 
98% Muslim country, many Moroccan secular feminists are Muslim but do not align 
themselves with Islamic feminism.  
 
NGO: Non-governmental Organization; nonprofit organization  
 
Niqab: “A form of the veil that covers the head, face, and torso” (Mahmood, 2012, p. 
202)  
 
Oulema: also written “Ulema”; “Islamic religious scholars” (Mahmood, 2012, p. 203) 
 
Patriarchy: n. The predominance of men in positions of power and influence in 
society, with cultural values and norms favoring men. (OED)  
 
Secularism: “separation of religion from issues of the state, and as the increasing 
differentiation of society into discrete spheres (economic, legal, educational, familial, 
and so on) of which religion is one part” (Mahmood, 2012, p. 47) 
 
Secular Feminism: Feminism that does not take religion into account  
 
Sharia: “moral discourses and legal procedures that are often glossed as ‘Islamic Law’” 
(Mahmood, 2012, p. 203) 
 
Sunna: “describes the practices of the Prophet and his Companions, and is considered 
the second most important source for the derivation of Islamic law and de-emphasis on 
fidelity to any one school” (Mahmood, 2012, p. 203)  
 
Sura: also written “surah” or “surat”; meaning chapter of the Quran 
 
Quran: also written “Koran”; the sacred book of Islam believed to be dictated by God 
(Allah) to the Prophet Mohammed and written in Arabic, consisting of 114 suras 
(chapters) 
 
Wahhabism: ultraconservatism within Sunni Islam
  
81  
Bibliography 
Abu-Lughod, L. (2002) Do Muslim Women Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections 
on Cultural Relativism and its Others. American Anthropologist 104/3 pp 783-
90  
Adichie, C. N. (2009). Chimamanda Adichie: The danger of a single 
story. TedGLOBAL Ted Talk. doi:10.1037/e513122011-001 
Alami, A. Morocco Said to Ban Sale of Burqas, Citing Security Concerns. (2017, Jan 
11). New York Times. Retrieved August 26, 2017, from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/world/africa/morocco-ban-burqa-
niqab.html?_r=0 
Altiok, O (2015). Muslim Family Laws and CEDAW: A Fact Sheet. Sociologists for 
Women in Society. 1-5. 
Amine, K. (2016). After the ‘Years of Lead’ in Morocco: Performing the Memory. New 
Theatre Quarterly, 32(02), 121-141. doi:10.1017/s0266464x16000038 
Badran, M. (2010). Où en est le féminisme islamique ?. Critique internationale, 46,(1), 
25-44. doi:10.3917/crii.046.0025. 
Barlas, A. (2002). Believing Women in Islam:  Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of 
the Quran. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press.  
Basu, Amrita. 2010. Women’s Movements in the Global Era: The Power of Local 
Feminisms. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.  
Bordat, S., Kouzzi, S., and Schaefer Davis, S. (2011). Women as Agents of Grassroot 
Change: Illustrating Micro-Empowerment in Morocco, Journal of Middle East 
Women's Studies, Volume 7, Number 1, 90-119.  
Center for Studies and Research on Women in Islam (2015). Introduction to the Center.  
Center for Studies and Research on Women in Islam (2015). Translation of the text 
introducing the Rabita. 
Codd, R.A. (1999). A Critical Analysis of the Role of Ijtihad in Legal Reforms in the 
Muslim World. Arab Law Quarterly, Vol 14, No 2. 112-131.  
Convention Sur L’Élimination de toutes les formes de Discrimination à L’Égard des 
Femmes. (n.d.). Retrieved November 14, 2017, from 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/fconvention.htm 
Cooke, Miriam. Women Claim Islam: Creating Islamic Feminism Through Literature. 
New York: Routledge. 2001. Print.   
 
 
82  
Davids, N. (2014). Are Muslim women in need of Islamic feminism? In consideration 
of a re-imagined Islamic educational discourse. British Journal of Religious 
Education, 37(3), 311-325. doi:10.1080/01416200.2014.944096 
Eddouada, S., Pepicelli, R. (2010). Morocco: Toward an “Islamic State Feminism”, 
Critique Internationale No 46 (1/100), 87-100. 
Eddouada, S. & Pepicelli, R. (2010). Maroc : vers un « féminisme islamique 
d'État ». Critique internationale, 46,(1), 87-100. doi:10.3917/crii.046.0087. 
Ferree, Myra Marx and Aili Mari Tripp. 2006. Global Feminism: Transnational 
Women’s Activism, Organizing, and Human Rights. New York: New York 
University Press.  
Hesford, W. S., & Kozol, W. (2005). Just advocacy?: womens human rights, 
transnational feminisms, and the politics of representation. New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press. 
Kingdom of Morocco (2011). Constitution.  
Kingdom of Morocco (2004). Moudawana.  
Lamrabet, A. (2016). How to Defeat Radicalism. Chatham House, The World Today. 
Lamrabet, A. (2016). Quelles Alternatives Devant Le Radicalisme? Retrieved 
November 5, 2017, from http://www.asma-lamrabet.com/articles/quelles-
alternatives-devant-le-radicalisme/  
Maddy-Weitzman, B. (2005). Women, Islam, and the Moroccan State: The Struggle 
Over Personal Status Law. The Middle East Journal, Vol. 59, No. 3. 393-410.  
Mahmood, S. (2012). Politics of piety the Islamic revival and the feminist subject. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 
Mir-Hosseini, Z. (2006). Muslim Women’s Quest for Equality: Between Islamic Law 
and Feminism. Critical Inquiry, Summer 2006, 629-645. 
Mohanty, C. T. (1988). Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial 
Discourses. Palgrave Macmillan Journals, Feminist Review (No. 30), 61-88. 
doi:10.1007/978-1-137-07412-6_5 
MRA Women | Mobilising for Rights Associates (n.d.). Qui sommes nous ? Retrieved 
March 16, 2017, from http://mrawomen.ma/fr/about-us/ 
Musawah | Equality in the Muslim Family (n.d.). Home. Retrieved November 16, 2017, 
from http://www.musawah.org 
 
 
83  
Poljarevic, Emin . "Islamism." In The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Politics. 
Oxford Islamic Studies Online  Nov 22, 2015. http://0-
www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.mylibrary.qu.edu.qa/article/opr/t342/e0252 
Pruzan-Jørgensen, J.E. (2013) Islamic Women’s Activism In The Arab World: 
Potentials and Challenges for External Actors, Danish Institute for International 
Studies Report, 2012:02, 1-82. 
Sadiqi, F. (2006). Morocco's Veiled Feminists. Project Syndicate. Retrieved October 5, 
2017. 
Said, E. (1978). Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. Penguin Books Ltd. 
Salime, Z. (2012). A New Feminism? Gender Dyanamics in Morocco’s February 20th 
February Movement, Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol 13 #5. 101-
114. 
Solfrini, F. (2016, June 26). The Changing Face of the Moroccan Jihadism. Retrieved 
November 16, 2017, from http://mediterraneanaffairs.com/2720-2/ 
Terror blasts rock Casablanca. (2003, May 17). BBC News. Retrieved August 26, 2017, 
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3035803.stm 
United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (1979). Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, articles 1-30. 1-10. 
Volpp, L. (2006). Disappearing Acts: On Gendered Violence, Pathological Cultures, 
and Civil Society. PMLA, 121(5), 1631-1638. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25501636 
Zvan-Elliott, K. (2014).Morocco and Its Women’s Rights Struggle. Journal of Middle 
East Womens Studies, 10(2), 1-30. doi:10.2979/jmiddeastwomstud.10.2.1 
Zvan-Elliott, K. (2015). Modernizing Patriarchy: The Politics of Women’s Rights in 
Morocco. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press.   
 
